

JPRS-WER-85-072

3 September 1985

West Europe Report

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3 September 1985

WEST EUROPE REPORT

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POLITICAL

CYPRUS

U.S. PRESSURE SEEN IN CONTEXT OF TRNC SHAKEDOWN

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 27 Jun 85 pp 1, 11

[Article by Cengiz Candar: "U.S. Pressure on Cyprus"]

[Text] Nicosia - The "American pressure" expected to follow on the heels of the crystallization of the Republic of Northern Cyprus [TRNC] by means of the TRNC general elections lost no time in showing up. U.S. State Department Cyprus Coordinator Richard Haas is coming to Nicosia on 30 June. Haas will hold talks with TRNC President Rauf Denktas on 1 July. The fact that Haas is coming to Cyprus for the first time in quite some time is thought to be connected with the Turkish side's strong reaction to the new documents prepared by UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar, and the American official is expected to try to get the Turkish side to soften its stance.

Haas is coming to Cyprus as soon as the TRNC general elections are over but before a new government is formed and, according to information obtained from U.S. embassy sources in the Greek Cypriot sector, Denktas was informed of this in a visit by U.S. Cyprus Ambassador Boehm the day after the elections.

It attracts notice that Richard Haas' trip to Cyprus to talk with Denktas coincides with the negotiations U.S. Under Secretary of Defense Richard Perle is conducting in Ankara between Turkey and the United States on the Defense Cooperation Agreement. It is thought that Washington will be bringing into play some round-about pressure on the Turkish Cypriot side on the order of "The Turkish side needs to offer concessions in order to persuade Congress as regards aid to Turkey."

As a result of the Turkish side's opposition to Perez de Cuellar's latest initiative, as far as was clear from Denktas' speeches, Haas is expected to say, "Don't reject the secretary general's proposal out of hand. It is not necessary for you to accept it completely, but accept it as a basis for negotiation."

Looking at information out of Washington, Haas' visit to Cyprus also has to do with the hardening conflict between the U.S. State Department and the Pentagon. The State Department's Cyprus team was split up at the time the TRNC was proclaimed. Under Secretary of State Richard Burt, considered the head of this team, was appointed to the Bonn embassy. Cyprus desk chief Sherman soon left Washington after being appointed to a different job. William Rope, chief of the Southern Europe desk which deals with Turkey, Greece and Cyprus, may be appointed to another

job. Haas, therefore, is understood to be a "lonely man" at this point, and the pressure mechanism he plans to use on the TRNC is understood to have a little to do also with the internal balances of the U.S. administration and to "come from weakness."

Be that as it may, the Turkish Cypriot side is much stronger vis-a-vis pressures than it was prior to the 17 January New York summit. The Turkish side's sitting down at the negotiation table with the Greek side, if that can be resumed, will be impossible before the new TRNC parliament is seated and the government formed and working so that it can take up the question of talks with the Greek Cypriots and make a decision on it. This will not be possible before October, according to optimistic estimates.

Under the new TRNC Constitution, the president does not have sole responsibility for the executive. The constitution grants a principal role to the government also, and also establishes a balance between the executive and the legislative.

It also introduces an oversight mechanism. For this reason, the functioning of the TRNC organs will require at least several months' time to make talks with the Greek Cypriots possible, regardless of the amount of U.S. pressure. Moreover, one thing the Turkish Cypriot side is quick to underscore is that there is no one on the other side for them to talk to at the moment because of the political crisis. That is, it is not realistic to expect the Turkish Cypriot side to say "Yes" to meeting with the Greek Cypriots until the power problem is solved on the Greek Cypriot side.

8349

CSO: 3554/140

POLITICAL

CYPRUS

CANDIDATE EROGLU ON COALITION PROSPECTS, OTHER PARTY COMMENTS

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 27 Jun 85 p 3

[Article by Izzet Riza Yalin: "We May Form Coalition with CLP or NBP"]

[Text] Nicosia - NUP [National Unity Party] General Chairman Dr Dervis Eroglu, expected to form a government following announcement of the general election results in the TRNC [Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus], indicated that it would be impossible for them to go into a coalition with the runner-up party, the RTP [Republican Turkish Party]. Eroglu said they would be able to form a coalition with the CLP [Communal Liberation Party] or the NBP [New Birth Party]. CLP General Chairman Ismail Bozkurt, meanwhile, pointed out that, owing to the internal circumstances of the country and foreign conditions, they believe there is a need for a stable government and, therefore, they would give serious attention to any proposals that would come to them about forming a government.

RTP General Chairman Ozker Ozgur, meanwhile, said, "Our people have given the RTP the task of major opposition. The NUP itself knows which party other than the RTP it will form a coalition with. We, as the RTP, will be conducting a pro-labor opposition and will do everything we can to prevent implementation of the repressive articles of the constitution."

The NUP assembly, meanwhile, will meet tomorrow and decide on its post-election course and the method to employ in forming a government. The top story in yesterday's KIBRIS POSTASI, the newspaper of which DPP [Democratic People's Party] Chairman Ismet Kotak is editor-in-chief, reported that Prime Minister Turgut Ozal had given the NUP 315 million liras for the elections. The report said that shortly before the elections, an ANAP [Motherland Party] delegation had gone to the TRNC and given to NUP officers 315 million liras described as an "election tactic" and at the same time as a "gift." The newspaper's second lead story was this report: "A coalition will be formed between the NUP and the NBP. This is a pre-arranged set-up by Ozal, big money, the NUP and the embassy." The following statement appeared in the report: "The purpose of the prearranged set-up is to tighten the hold on the games being played in Cyprus. An imposed solution is envisaged whereby Maras [Varosia] would be turned over to the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish immigrants sent back to Turkey. Ozal chose the NUP and the NBP to facilitate the solution he is trying to have imposed on the Turkish Cypriot people. It is the NUP's and NBP's job to block the objections that would be raised in the TRNC. The Turkish embassy's meddling in the elections has been offensive to the citizenry."

8349

CSO: 3554/140

POLITICAL

CYPRUS

DAILY QUESTIONS GREEK STUDY OF 1974 EVENTS

NC070815 Nicosia I SIMERINI in Greek 7 Aug 85 p 1

[Editorial: "The Great Mockery"]

[Text] The mockery surrounding the opening of the Cyprus file continues without mercy! After 11 Years Athens now tells us that an investigating committee will be named in 2 months! What will this committee be doing? It will conduct an inquiry to find out who are responsible for the "destruction" of Cyprus! However, any Greeks capable of thinking knows that a file did exist with all the proof and incriminating evidence, and that for 11 whole years efforts to open this file were simply not made.

Now we are being told that the file will be compiled after October, when the investigating committee starts its work. This is what Ioannis Alevras, president of the Greek Chamber of Deputies, told us the other day. It is obvious that this sadistic tale about the Cyprus file will never end. The periodic expedencies that brought the file into the limelight from time to time and then withdrew it, will once again continue to do the same in the future. In the meantime, the long suffering Greek Cypriots will be waiting to be told (just to satisfy their curiosity) who is to blame for their tragedy.

The problem has always been how to specifically determine which of the leaders -- through their actions or omissions -- caused the events leading to the coup and invasion. It appears that there is no factual proof on these specific leaders.... In the past the file was used for demagoguery and political intimidation. It appears that the same mentality prevails today and that the same interests are being served.

The questions that Greek Cypriots have been asking ever since, however, are the following:

1 -- The president of the Republic of Greece, General Gizikis, departed from the presidential palace with honors. The question was, and always remains the same: Why is it that others were put on trial and were imprisoned, while he (who was the head of state) was not even questioned and departed with honors?

2 -- Why is it that Konstandinos Karamanlis and his political guard kept the file tightly sealed during their administration?

3 -- Why is it that Andreas Papandreou -- who promised that as soon as he took over he would open the file -- now tells us that such a file does not exist and that its compilation will start in October?

We over here, naturally, never had nor do we now have any delusions. The file was never opened nor is it likely that it will ever open. Even if it does open, everyone will be disappointed because it will only contain poor depositions and well-worn and oft-repeated things. Why is this? This is because no evidence can be supplied about these tragic developments without irreparably degrading the Greek nation, specifically, its leaders.

The issue, in any case, has become tragicomic. After 11 whole years, responsible leaders should not busy themselves with the responsibilities of 1974. Instead they ought to deal with the responsibilities of 1985! The Karamanlis guard in 1974 told us that it could not help Cyprus because of the distance involved; 10 years later the Papandreou guard told us that Cyprus could be occupied militarily by Turkey within 48 to 72 hours. These are the responsibilities of the post-coup leaders. Now it is time that they look into how to save Cyprus, instead of looking into how to compile the file on Cyprus, with 11 years delay and an investigation in 1985!

CSO: 3521/322

POLITICAL

DENMARK

POLITICAL SCENARIO UNTIL YEAR 2000 ENVISIONED

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE SONDAG in Danish 30 Jun 85 Sec II pp 1, 2

[Article by Mogens Berendt]

[Text] This article, the first in a series of five, was written by Mogens Berendt, who was a well-known TV journalist and social critic in the 1980's. Mogens Berendt, who here sums up the state of affairs around the end of this century, now lives in Provence in southern France where one of his neighbors is the former leader of the small Radical Liberal Party, Niels Helveg Petersen.

In his first article for BERLINGSKE SONDAG Mogens Berendt describes political developments in Denmark in the late 1980's and 1990's. He analyzes the background for the collapse of the red-green cabinet under Svend Auken's leadership after only 2 years and the developments that paved the way for Prime Minister Ellemann-Jensen's comeback in Danish politics.

Provence, 30 Jun 2000--We have given up on the lawn.

Tomorrow we will go over to our neighbors, the Dassaults, and admit that we lost the bet. They have been able to see that all summer. Ever since March they have been looking forward to their reward: the best meal we can provide with the best wines for sale in the Var district. They deserve it.

"You might just as well give up the idea of growing a lawn--it will shrivel up by 1 July. Let it go like the rest of the yard and take care of the vegetable garden and the roses," the Dassaults said.

"If it is not growing out there, green, soft and lush on 1 July 2000, we'll give you the best meal we can provide."

"Only English people can grow lawns in Provence," said M. Dassault. "On the other hand that is one of the few things they can do."

I tend to agree with Dassault there. Aside from the last war the English have not been able to come up with much in the last 100 years, at least not if they have to do the work themselves. There are a lot of them down here now--Dassault always thought there were too many--but M. Dassault can well understand why they want to leave home. Great Britain is really becoming a social phenomenon in Europe. But at least those who leave home can grow lawns--by themselves.

The local residents don't understand how they do it either. Some have even been given instructions and water and fertilize their lawns as prescribed by the English. But the results have only reinforced their view that one cannot trust the English, they must be keeping something secret. Besides God did not create Provence for the purpose of growing lawns there.

"The same thing is true of Denmark," we said. "But we had a lawn each year in Denmark that resembled the tiny plot in front of St. James' Church!"

"Where?" asked M. Dassault.

On 1 July 2000 we gave up. In September Susanne can go out and pick wild parsley and thyme on the former lawn.

"But why did you leave Denmark--if everything was going well there?" M. Dassault asked. He regards the English emigres with a mixture of social understanding and historical malice--but he has an easier time identifying with the Danes: a small agricultural population that had got along on its own terms without any help, endowed with innate cunning, a talent for survival and an independent attitude that never overemphasized principles unless they paid off. That is how Provence also maintained its own identity through the tidal waves of history, whether they consisted of Saracens, Romans, northern Italians, Frenchmen from Paris or foreign emigres from the North. As a native of Provence he could identify with the region of Europe called Denmark. It didn't matter to him that it called itself a nation.

"What do you have to complain about in Denmark except for the fact that I have heard winter lasts half the year there?"

Well, not really much in addition to what we complained about 15 years ago. Things are better for some, worse for others and even though Denmark still has the insoluble national economic problems it had in the 1980's new solutions to the insoluble have turned up that the central democracy can spend the next 15 years working its way through. The pattern is the same as the one we had in the 1980's--political tasks are not solved, they are just postponed so long that reality redefines the tasks, making the lack of a solution appear to be a kind of solution. The situation that has been made worse in this way can then be described as an entirely new problem.

Things may become different now--why shouldn't a new millenium usher in a new epoch in a democratic tradition that has worn itself out over the last 50 years? What may seem paradoxical to many people is that it is Prime

Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen who will preside over this development. It would have happened much sooner but some shakeups were necessary before it was possible.

Politics was becoming suspect in the 1980's; this was not so much the fault of the politicians as of the parliamentary system that produced them. Every rigid political situation promotes revolt: this occurred when the VKR [Liberal/Conservative/Radical Liberal] government in the 1970's continued and strengthened a Social Democratic policy and the nonsocialist section of the Danish electorate discovered that it had no political alternative. Enter one Mogens Glistrup and his "Progressive Party," a protest movement whose fatal flaw was the belief that it was a qualified political party. So it disappeared as a result of entirely natural causes. Danes would prefer to forget the most embarrassing elements in this movement.

For 30 years in fact, from the 1970's to the end of the 1990's, Denmark had no form of national political leadership; people just went in for politics. It is easy to understand why people got tired of it. Externally Denmark was respected as a country that in spite of having a great many parties, constant elections and an endless succession of economic compromises managed to remain stable and give the impression of being a nation that was making progress. This was a true picture, but with some modifications.

The country was not politically stable. The economy was a controlled landslide and only the fact that the other advanced welfare states in northern Europe had run into similar difficulties prevented Denmark from being officially declared a "mismanaged nation," as they say nowadays. And then the country was saved by oil.

This was the main reason why Poul Schluter ruled for so long as prime minister. For a period in the 1980's he looked like the right man at the right time--and he was for a while, to give him his due. After several years of a sour Social Democratic rule that tried to continue on a course that had been long outmoded, Prime Minister Anker Jorgensen stepped down. And suddenly, after decades of wandering through the desert, a politician emerged as the nonsocialist alternative: Poul Schluter.

He offered a simple attitude toward a complex reality, namely an optimistic outlook on the problems, an indomitable determination to solve them in spite of an impossible political situation, and on the purely mental level he minted a new medallion: it was once more respectable to be a nonsocialist. For a long time this had been a term of abuse.

For several years he and the "four-leaf-clover government" as he called the nonsocialist coalition in his unique Boy Scout way, ruled on the basis of haphazard compromise solutions, abandoned principles and a security policy balancing act that finally led Denmark to pull one foot out of NATO. I don't really think the man did it just so he could continue to act as prime minister. He believed in a nonsocialist Denmark in the oldfashioned sense. And he could not see any other alternative. He was right about that. Danes

were not ready for modern alternatives in the 1980's. The left and right wings were equally reactionary.

But Poul Schluter was identified with a reactionary line and a political malice that he did not possess and did not practice. He did what he could in the political vacuum that existed in Denmark in which traditionally-minded socialist parties would not admit that Denmark was no longer an industrial nation with perspiring workers in blue overalls--and in which some nonsocialist parties believed that the old values could be used as a new driving force. Both sides stuck to their own outmoded slogans.

So it was not Poul Schluter and his four-leaf-clover government who were reactionary. The 1980's were reactionary because it was politically impossible to jump into the real world. A cosmetic tax compromise was called the decade's most spectacular political event. And it was too. There were no other political events.

The figures were sufficiently eloquent, ever since Social Democratic Finance Minister Knud Heinesen said at the beginning of the decade that Denmark was standing on the verge of an economic abyss. It did not take much brilliance to see this but it took a lot of political courage to say something about it and Knud Heinesen possessed that courage. Not much came out of this although it was the real reason why the Social Democrats realized that they could not pursue Social Democratic policy in the years that lay ahead. They decided to let a nonsocialist government take a beating and retire to the sidelines. This was a long-term ticket to a national showdown and the second half of the game has just started now.

A foreign debt of 200 billion kroner and a domestic debt of 500 billion kroner--three-quarters of the country's annual national product!--that rose at a rate of 25 billion a year. But there was no political opportunity to pursue anything but a grocery-store economy. The spirit of the times favored simplifications; this cost the nation dearly. Perhaps it is some comfort today that this was the last decade one heard otherwise talented people use expressions such as "class struggle," "the working class" and "nonsocialist Denmark."

The leftist parties enjoyed criticizing the conditions they had produced themselves and unemployment was the labor movement's final deception, even though everyone in a position of responsibility knew that it had become a permanent concept that had to be redefined so that the nation's parliamentary situation could move forward. Schluter acted within the old Danish parliamentary tradition, low-key in relation to his party's position and tolerant of the minorities--indeed he had little choice because at that time the Radical Liberals occupied their usual role as the decisive political factor in the country and Niels Helveg Petersen was in charge. But even if Prime Minister Schluter could have changed the country, he was not the politician who would have done so. He pursued the soft Danish line, more friendly than he needed to be, more accommodating than he had to be from a technical political point of view, more optimistic than he ever had any good reason to be.

Schluter became a strangely negative factor in Danish politics in those years, although the man himself was so positive that it was almost unbearable for both his supporters and his opponents. Danish politics had never been centered on personalities to that extent before. It is very easy to understand now when we have 15 years of hindsight.

The Social Democrats had played out their traditional role and were unable to define a new one and the labor organizations' almost supraparliamentary role in the economy as well as the political infrastructure had run into massive opposition even in their own ranks. Some fixed power structures in the Danish structure were pushed up against some realities that they knew would defeat them. Neither the labor movement and the increasingly militant salaried employees' movement nor supercapitalistic nonsocialist Danes wanted to make the 1980's a watershed decade. Schluter became an oddly un-Danish symbol of evil because the best leftist reactionary demagogues chose the solution chosen by all demagogues: a single person. The person they could tell people represented everything that they could no longer combat. This is the phenomenon identified by C. G. Jung as "projection ~~and~~ *syndrome*." This was enhanced by the fact that EKSTRA BLADET, at that time Denmark's biggest newspaper, resorted to the same method to keep its circulation figures high.

Neither the hallelujah conservatives nor the frustrated late-Sixties generation with their Volvos, suburban houses and membership cards in SF [Socialist People's Party] can have believed that their attitudes were pointing anywhere except perhaps backward. Both sides concentrated on Poul Schluter, even though none of them could have believed that he was the right man. He did not resemble someone who could restore the advertised absolute rule and the discreet charm of nonsocialism or alternatively a man one loves to hate.

Did one ever hear Poul Schluter and Anker Jorgensen say anything bad about each other?

It is unlikely that any of the powerful crown princes in the inner circles of the Social Democratic Party at that time did. And the more intelligent people on the extreme left wing could certainly hear how idiotic it was to talk about "evil Schluter."

They should have concentrated on Uffe Ellemann-Jensen. He was an easy victim. Foreign minister in a government that could not conduct foreign policy, chairman of the ruling Liberal Party whose core of voters did not really like him and actually shared Anker Jorgensen's more personal than political aversion to him: he was too much of a Copenhagen man, too quick and too well-educated.

If they had been wiser they would have realized that Schluter was not a representative of the nonsocialist counterrevolution, just a natural transition figure, and that Uffe Ellemann (he has dropped the Jensen) represented the future that would knock the legs out from under them.

Now they are talking about making Schluter chairman of the EC Commission. The question is whether he will be up to it after 6 years in the top OECD post in Paris. But those years were probably more relaxing than the ones he spent as prime minister of Denmark. There was not really much for him to be optimistic about: his finance minister, Palle Simonsen, called it his biggest personal failure as a politician when he was unable to wipe out the national deficit in 1990 as he had promised--especially to himself. On the other hand he could easily excuse the continued foreign borrowing by saying that Denmark was now an oil nation and had to invest just as Norway did in the 1970's and 1980's.

So all is well--going downhill in style if one uses an abacus, but of course one can't do that in a modern economy. We are about to make the same mistake that has made Great Britain a European social phenomenon at the end of the century. The British have almost extracted the last of their oil in the North Sea and the money has been spent simply on maintaining their standard of living (for the well-heeled) without making any investments in a modern production apparatus. They have Europe's most dilapidated industry and most neglected educational system. The empire on which the sun never set is about to end up in the same predicament as Saudi Arabia.

So now it is up to Uffe Ellemann to guide the legacy that saved the four-leaf-clover government, though in a two-leaf form, in the 1988 election toward something resembling a future. It was the first time in heaven knows when that we held an election after a complete election period and the feat was repeated in 1992. But this did not help Poul Schluter. The man had run the smallest government since Hartling's straight Liberal government because oil and gas and the exchange rate of the dollar suddenly gave him something to be very optimistic about. The Radical Liberal Party shrank to two seats and the Social Democrats abandoned their Finlandization policy after Svend Auken replaced an increasingly confused Anker Jorgensen. The 1992 election should have carried Schluter well past retirement age. But they had not reckoned with the Greens.

Schluter admitted a short time ago that it was first in the 1992 election that he had something on which to base his optimism. He was as surprised at being swept out of office as Churchill was after his reign as prime minister from 1940 to 1945.

A strange way to thank someone who kept the morale of the population high while the country was being reduced to a second-class nation. Niels Helveg Petersen told me that recently. He has also moved to Provence and lives in Les Arcs, not far from here. We ran into each other by chance in Avignon.

"Isn't it funny that we should meet in the old city of exile for the popes?" I asked.

"I was just about to say the same thing to you," he replied.

Since Helveg left Brussels after 6 years as commissioner of culture and education, no more than half a year ago, there has been talk of making Poul

Schluter commission chairman. It is a long time since we have held the agricultural commissioner's post. Denmark is different now. And budget commissioner Henning Christophersen has returned home to serve as foreign minister, his favorite job.

It was very natural that Svend Auken became prime minister after the 1992 election. The Social Democrats only function in periods when things are getting better. But they would never have done so in the 1980's. When there is an economic boom ecology also fares well but no one had expected the Greens to get in in 1992. They were not a political factor in 1988 but certain things were reminiscent of 1968 as the boom and the nonsocialist wave, conformity and banalities began to be taken somewhat for granted and there had to be a reaction.

As in 1968 it was not social, although social differences had become even greater than they were then. It was again a revolt against a coagulating society.

It was the young people again, the women, who have always been a bigger revolutionary political force than politicians have been willing to believe, the new ecological luxury sniffers who drove electric cars and smoked vegetable cigarettes on their manure-fertilized lawns in the better districts of thatched houses who created the Greens as a massive movement for everything that the Conservatives, the Socialist People's Party, the Left-Socialists (whatever happened to them?), the Christian People's Party (as they were called), the Radical Liberals and certainly the Social Democrats were unable to offer.

The red-green cabinet lasted 2 years. The women probably thought they would get the country's first woman prime minister, but Ritt Bjerregaard was too dogmatic for the Greens' taste. Georg Poulsen was too reminiscent of something from the 1970's so it fell to Svend Auken. It was not a big surprise. The man wasn't really unpopular. But what was he supposed to do? Denmark's most talented politician, Gert Petersen, had to be named foreign minister and even if the Greens hadn't put a spoke in the wheel the result would have been the same as the relations between Lenin and Kerensky. However the regime came to an end here without any bloodshed.

Ebbe Reich Klovedal became ecology minister--like heavy pieces of driftwood, he only comes in with the really big waves--Suzanne Brogger became minister of cultural affairs (for 2 1/2 months). Svend Auken gave up as early as 1994. The economists in the Budget Ministry did the impossible in denying that the Socialist People's Party's program would require using the annual national product twice over along with half of Norway's oil (which they did quite well just as they issued forecasts during Schluter's regime without anyone discovering that they were describing a catastrophe).

Svend Auken officially resigned when the Greens demanded a ban on all artificial fertilizer on Danish fields, a ban on car traffic at certain times on holidays, a maximum speed of 60 km and--this was the last straw--the

closing of all polluting industries in Denmark within 10 years. The vision of the Greens was correct, but they were 20 years ahead of their time. The national economy could not take such demands at that time. It is first now that these problems are gradually solving themselves.

There was no reason for an election in 1994 against that background, so Auken's departure was a repetition of Anker Jorgensen's. Uffe Ellemann emerged as an alternative, a technocrat like Auken but with a bright new program that matched the coming turn of the millennium. The Liberals had long been becalmed. They had a hard time finding out what was liberal but in the 1996 election the party finally discovered what had gone on for the past 30 years. And now it was possible: there were not many farmers left in the country, the nonsocialists could be tempted by a future that did not seem entirely Kampuchean, the Greens could be embraced since they had really been right about a lot of things, they had just been too impatient--and most important of all there were very clear plans for a quick and consistent implementation of distributing profits in all private firms, bonus arrangements for public employees and a guaranteed wage for all citizens.

Helveg Petersen told me in Avignon that Uffe Ellemann now claimed that his old ambition of introducing the Close Society combined with the supranational Efficient Society--the Liberals' gospel under Hartling in the 1970's--was now about to be fulfilled. Helveg didn't believe it though. That the ambition was an old one, that is.

Now it is an election year at the end of the century. I would have liked to talk a little more about that with Helveg Petersen and hear what he thought about the Radical Liberals' chances. They still have only two representatives, I can't remember their names but they look strangely alike in pictures. Tweed jackets, bow ties and longer haircuts than most Danes prefer.

We agreed that the Helveg Petersens would come to visit Cotignac. They had never heard of the town. It is nothing special, it is like a lot of other small towns in Provence. That is the whole point. It's a good place to be.

They will come to dinner with the Dassaults. We intend to ask them if they have tried to grow a lawn too.

6578

CSO: 3613/174

POLITICAL

GREECE

GOVERNMENT SEEN MORE RESPONSIVE TO EUROPEAN UNION

Athens | KATHIMERINI in Greek 23 Jul 85 p 1

/Article by correspondent Kostas Kekis: "Athens Too Now Wants the European Union"/

/Excerpt/ Brussels--The Greek government abandoned the "braggatism" it displayed at the Milan EEC summit meeting and yesterday appeared more conciliatory on the issue of European unity. At its meeting the EEC Foreign Ministers' Council unanimously decided--we stress the word "unanimously"--to convene the inter-governmental conference which will consider the revision of a Rome treaty article and the enactment into law for political cooperation of EEC member states.

England, Denmark and Greece did not insist on their objections at the previous Milan meeting. Instead, they accepted without reservations to have the inter-governmental conference convened. Their especially "conciliatory" representative surpassed the majority of the ministers' council who expected if not a stormy, at least a meeting beset by disagreements.

On this particular issue the Greek side chose to follow "the way of dialogue" waiting to present its positions after leaving all other proposals at the negotiation table. Such a tactic leaves several margins for maneuvering and negotiating at least as concerns the issue of legislating political cooperation.

The New Line

Applying the new Athens mild line, Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Th. Pangalos limited his remarks to pointing out to the council's other members that: Greece repeats the position it presented at the Milan meeting, according to which the government believes it is not necessary to convene the inter-governmental conference and that if the Community wants to go ahead with it it can do so by implementing the Rome treaty provisions and some other practical solutions.

Since, however, the majority of the EEC members wants this inter-governmental conference, Greece will participate in it and will try to achieve its goals which are: to avoid disturbing the acquired Community rights; to avoid a Europe of two speeds and to promote measures for coalescing economic issues.

POLITICAL

GREECE

ND'S BOUTOS LEAVES PARTY, CHANGES EP AFFILIATION

Boutos Announces Withdrawal

Athens RIZOSPASTIS in Greek 16 Jul 85 p 1

/Text/ A serious breach has been created in the ND ranks with the sensational withdrawal of Giannis Boutos who, in his announcement yesterday, criticized Mitsotakis. Specifically, Boutos who until yesterday was one of the ND cadres and had served as minister in the Karamanlis and Rallis governments, accused Mitsotakis that after his election defeat "instead of undertaking a self-examination which was necessary for the party's recovery and instead of rising to the occasion and handing over the party's responsibilities to a younger generation, he is occupying himself with indecent and unusual personal attacks which aim at the annihilation of leading and honored party cadres."

In response to the above accusations, Mitsotakis criticized Boutos for leaving the party where, as he said, "he savored particular favors and is the only one the party elected as deputy by placing him on the preferred 'list' of candidates." In his statement, Mitsotakis let it be understood that probably others will follow Boutos but he is determined to safeguard the ND's unity as a representation of the party grass roots.

To the Mitsotakis statement Boutos responded that "under the ND cover Mitsotakis attempted to answer to my declaration of independence. He again failed. He forgot that he should not be talking on the 16th of July of each year."

According to reports, Boutos will hold a press conference on his views and future plans. Reliable sources said that his withdrawal from ND was not due to personal reasons but that it is an action which is part of a more general movement for the development of a new political party in the conservative area. It is worth noting that before leaving ND, Boutos had repeated contacts with leading cadres and non-party leaders of the Right.

Move to the Right in EP

Athens | KATHIMERINI in Greek 19 Jul 85 p 1

/Article by Brussels correspondent Kostas Kekis/

/Excerpts/ In a letter to the president of the European Parliament /EP/ yesterday, Giannis Boutos made it known that he is withdrawing from the EP political Group of Christian Democrats--the group to which ND deputies belong--and he is joining the European Democratic Rally (known as the Gaullist Group), thus severing all his ties with ND--the major opposition party in Greece.

The group Boutos joined (in his capacity as a Eurodeputy) is considered throughout Europe as conservative and as promoting advanced rightist positions as opposed to the Christian Democrats who are considered as centrist-rightists.

The Boutos withdrawal will cause some indiscernible effect for the moment but significant and tangible ones in the future since the strength of ND deputies in the Christian Democrats will decrease from nine to eight members. This change will drop the ND Eurodeputies from third to fourth position within the Christian Democrats.

This, in turn, will weaken the ND negotiating strength when, at the end of 1986, a redistribution of the main positions in the various organs of the European Parliament will be made (speakership of the parliament, chairmanships of political committees, etc.) since, in accordance with the system in force, the distribution of these positions is made by the political group to which the party belongs and is proportional to the strength (number of members) each party has.

At the same time ND will lose the one EP position to which it was entitled. This position was held by Boutos and according to the EP rules he will not lose it even if he joins another political group. Thus, ND will be unable to project in the political committee its political positions on international issues--many times this committee, of which Boutos is a member, discusses Greek national issues as, for example, the Cyprus question, relations with Turkey, etc. This, however, does not mean that the Greek presence in this committee will be weakened since Boutos will continue being a member.

According to press reports, Boutos joined the Gaullists under certain conditions. It became known that he asked the support of the Gaullists on all Greek issues and its positive contribution on all committee votings concerning Greece. At the same time he made clear his independence to express his views on economic, social and agricultural issues. These are sectors which have a particular relation with the ideological position of every politician.

The Boutos decision caught the EP circles by surprise as well as the ND party itself. Of course, the Gaullist group is the winner in the Boutos action. It increases its strength (numerically by the participation of a deputy from one more country) and it will have economic benefits from the EP budget. Also, Boutos opens a cooperation "channel" with the present French opposition.

Many believe the participation of a Greek Eurodeputy in one more EP political group will help to influence and exert pressure for the support of the Greek positions whenever national issues are being debated.

ND Censured

Athens | KATHIMERINI in Greek 19 Jul 85 p 1

/Text/ ND keeps alive the Boutos "issue" imitating, moreover, the illicit methods of other parties. Thus, its headquarters yesterday sent to the newspapers photocopies of telegrams by local organizations which denounce with unethical characterizations and unacceptable adjectives the Boutos independence.

Party cadres, who do not approve of the Boutos action, pointed out that these tactics of condemnation or disgrace, besides being foreign to ND character and tradition, expose the party itself for two reasons. First, until a few days ago Boutos was one of the party's top cadres who for many years was in charge of significant sectors of the state machinery. Therefore, the characterizations and insults against him act as a boomerang against the party.

Second, the mobilization of the party mechanism against a person is justifiably construed by ND adversaries as a sign of fear or as an attempt to impose party discipline through unacceptable methods.

7520
CSO: 3521/310

POLITICAL

GREECE

COMMENTS ON POSSIBLE COOPERATION OF LEFTIST PARTIES

Athens 1 KATHIMERINI in Greek 21-22 Jul 85 p 4

/Article by Khr. Karanikas: "Is the Cooperation of the Parties of the Left Being Prepared?"

/Text/ PASOK is being isolated as the contacts between the parties of the Greek Left have begun with unforeseen developments. For the first time since the 1968 rift the two KKE's are laying the foundations for some sort of cooperation for coping with the country's political problems while delineating at the same time their distance from the government front. Cultivation of the civil war climate and the single-dimensional polemics against the Right proved that they favor only PASOK and its grass roots' propaganda. From this viewpoint the Mitsotakis meetings with KKE Secretary General Khar. Florakis and KKE-Int. Chairman L. Kyrkos are charting new roads in the country's political life.

The election results provided the opportunity for the Greek Left to assess the real strength it can use at any critical moment. The elderly and the '40 generation proved to be inactive in its ranks because it reacted more symbolically and less politically to political situations. Thus, its loss in votes contributes to a better and more dynamic presence on the part of the rest of the voters--especially those of younger age--who joined the communist parties. These votes, however, introduced another political perception for coping with the vultures of the Left and the democratic front.

On the other hand, the dialogue between the conservatives and the leftists, that is, between the civil war opposite camps, aims at the virtual protection of the country's democratic institutions not only because they had been the main subject of the dialogue, but also because these two fronts are isolating the government by getting together and agreeing on the democratic dialogue. Kastri and its resident--Papandreou--until now have shown that the only thing they cannot tolerate is the democratic dialogue and for this reason they continuously resorted and are still resorting furiously to the propaganda covering the period between the two wars and to the usurpation of the country's recent history.

The feuds in the communist left concerning dogma, titles and past events favored the outsiders who appeared as the belated crusaders in the plundered land. Thus, the fact that the KKE-Int. Central Committee accepted the discussion on the change of its title, in reality opens the road for some form of cooperation between the two KKE's--something Florakis himself pointed out immediately after his recent meeting with the premier. In practice, this cooperation will permit the Greek Left to claim its place in the political life and to change from a pariah and a waterboy for others to an independent status if, indeed, it has something to say and if it believes its ideology is accepted in the world.

Cooperation of the Parties

The practical side of this cooperation between the two KKE's is of great significance for the country's political life. The problem is not so much in solving the 1968 split or rift; it is of no historic or dogmatic value who is at fault for the mistakes of the Greek Left--mistakes which qualitatively are almost equal to those of the Right and which are exploited by others completely unrelated with the country's roots.

The problem is whether the Left will have its own voice in the overall functioning of the democratic state and in coping with the daily economic and social problems; whether it will provide the possibility for all political tendencies in Greece to be expressed, thus helping in establishing the variety of views, that is, in safeguarding its own views because if anything happens in this country the Left will again be the first victim.

In the post-dictatorial years the split in the Greek Left not only prevented its own development, but through the insistence of its two major parties it acted as an impediment in the political life of the country. The importance of the political problems focused on what happened a few decades ago and to the most effective interpretation of the communists' bible--something that did not much interest the other political forces which wanted to express their views.

Even the economic and social claims were subjugated to these restrictions and the result was that popularized and oppressive systems, such as PASOK's socialism, prevailed. The Greek Left, being shackled to the past and being anxious to be expiated from its errors since it never wanted to discuss them and to be politically emancipated, allowed the perversion of its struggles and its unconditional surrender.

The practical side of cooperation between the two communist parties will have broader projections in the political behavior of the other forces (the emphasis on the word "cooperation" means that the consolidation of the two parties is of minor importance to the country's political life or perhaps it will again become a negative element since it will inevitably lead to dogmatism of the Marxist theory).

The world of the unaffiliated leftists or those of the 114 generation /Article 114 of the constitution on the defense of democratic freedom and usually inferring to the anti-monarchy demonstrations of 1965/ experienced a suffocating squeeze from the dogmatic clash between the two Left parties. This dogmatic "coating", moreover, extended--as was expected--to the smaller party offsprings which as expected were assuming the character of neophyte fanaticism.

The significance lies in the interactions which will spring from the broader spectrum of the political life with the acceptance of the dialogue by the Left. The government front is the only one which will react--as it has started reacting already with its undermining and other efforts and with the assistance of the extreme Right. This effort started, moreover, with accusations for the unnatural developments concerning the dialogue between Mitsotakis and Florakis, a dialogue which must be the main goal of a government in a democratic country.

PASOK's Dissimilarity

The practical side of cooperation between the two leftist parties and of the dialogue with the conservative forces assumes a special significance because it transforms this climate into fertile soil for the advancement of the economic and social struggles. The forces which simply contest or claim their economic and social rights have the possibility to coordinate their efforts in a climate of dialogue.

The economic crisis and the social stalemate, together with the uncoordinated policy of subsidies adopted by the government in order to placate the pensioners and the elderly, have created an accumulation of problems in the country. The unemployment increases at an accelerated rate, the cost of living is out of control, and foreign debt is choking the economy.

Anyway, it is somewhat difficult for the Greek people to continuously have a government of the Right--some time this too will end even though the government is reviving it despite the election results. The government's fear derives mainly from its dissimilarity and from Kastro's inability to control the developments within it in a climate of democratic dialogue and social struggles.

When, moreover, the economic struggles are predicted to be particularly hard and the weakness of the government to be occupied even with the economic facts in advance, is evident that the only weapon PASOK has is the promotion of the polarized climate and the continued resurrection of the danger of the Right.

This propaganda, which found ground in the voluntary censorship of the Left and in the devotion of the former ND leadership during the 1950 decade, cannot easily find response in the radical change of the grass roots' political climate. Because, as ready as the Riot Control Units and the National Defense Unit may be for a 24 action, it would be rather difficult for one to

accept the notion that the Greek people and especially the young men who did not vote PASOK are full of fear and are ready to run away with the first salvo. On the contrary, Greek history teaches something else, which is being misconstrued by those who have not lived it or who prefer to adjust it to their old traumatic experiences. Just as the struggles of the 114 generation or those against the dictators started with a few determined persons, it is likewise possible for some determined person to take it to street demonstrations as the reality of fascism is again being revealed as it did between the two wars.

The question lies elsewhere, to the government's reactions when it finds out that the idols of its promises are crashing down and when the cold war propaganda ceases to find response. Then developments will emerge within the majority party which politically and historically is multifacted. Moreover, the delay in forming the government had multiple objectives besides the promotion of the picture of an all-powerful and singular leader, the maintenance of hopes for all, and the suppression of any interactions. But the solution of the problems will also be assessed because the delay in announcing the new cabinet had a positive influence only at the top. The other forces, the live forces of the Greek society, play a role among the common people.

7520

CSO: 3521/312

POLITICAL

GREECE

ND'S INTERNECINE CRISIS: COMMENTS, WARNING ISSUED

Internal Opposition

Athens ELEVTHEROTYPIA in Greek 18 Jul 85 p 9

/Article by Nikos Kaïos: "Where Does the ND Internal Crisis Lead?"

/Excerpts Just a month and a half after its 2 June electoral defeat the New Democracy Party sees its strength reduced by two deputies, one of whom is a high-ranking member of the party leadership.

The choice of independent status by Dion. Livanos and Giannis Boutos, coupled with the expulsion of party cadres Pan. Gennimatas and G. Stefanakis, brought into the open both the smoldering party leadership crisis and the controversy over Mitsotakis, which was evident even before he was elected ND leader last September by the Legislative Group.

These chain reactions have no precedent neither after the 1981 post-election period nor after the 1984 Europarlament election. The new reality with its crash landing after the pre-election high flying is proving to be painful for Mitsotakis.

While he declares he is not like Rallis and Averof, and is not planning to resign, the situation in the party, not only in the Parliamentary Group, is increasingly resembling a boiling pot.

The members of the new Parliamentary Group have a wider range of political orientation than in the previous group. Under the same roof we find deputies with socialist leanings, former centrists, liberals, new liberals and others from the extreme Right or at least casting side glances in that direction. Variety and multi-collectivity.

The evil prophets who could not see a victory on 2 June under Mitsotakis were fully vindicated. They may not be celebrating for the sake of "party unity," but they are smiling with self-satisfaction and not hesitating to remind people of their prediction. The myths about the leader's personality were revealed. Although he is a capable man, one cannot forget that the people reproduce in their minds stereotypes. Mitsotakis carries many stereotypes-- a lot of history.

Boutos supported Mitsotakis in his bid for election to the ND chairmanship. In fact he changed his stand in favor of Stefanopoulos at the last moment. Yet, before long there were clashes between them. They were not clashes on a political or ideological level. They referred to Boutos' ranking in the party hierarchy and his future prospects. Later, Boutos expressed views which appeared "conciliatory" to PASOK when he spoke of "consensus".

Inevitably the break came with Mitsotakis helping it along by leaking to his friendly newspapers that "a Boutos issue" existed.

The question now is who is next. Kon. Stefanopoulos made some motions in the direction of the "conservative party" but then he slowed down and is now reported to be waiting for "conditions to ripen up."

M. Evert, careful with his actions, moves "behind the scenes," declaring his loyalty to Mitsotakis, while at the same time he does not hesitate to make heretical moves toward the governmental policies. In this he is supported by his friends in the pro-government press.

Averof, who was Mitsotakis' main supporter, does not hide his displeasure, but at the same time makes no move for the time being to overthrow Mitsotakis.

Rallis, withdrawn to the sidelines as a reserve, receives the favorable support of centrist cadres because of his decency, and is said to be following a wait-and-see attitude.

A detail. Boutos is not on good terms with any of these individuals, although he is reported to have had contacts with Giannis Varvitsiotis.

Mitsotakis--who is, in reality, being challenged--holds the seal of the party and just lets the time grind on. He looks forward to the party congress hoping to receive a fresh authorization as the party leader. At the same time he is taking steps to gain external support (Kohl, Reagan, Thatcher) as well as domestically, both within the party and out, playing the "game" of contacts with other party leaders.

Even though right now there are no "massive" and open moves to challenge Mitsotakis, there is a floating view within the party that it cannot go on to the next electoral campaign with Mitsotakis at the helm.

ND cadres, who even at the worst moments of the Averof leadership crisis saw no break up of the party, do not consider such prospects now as improbable. In any event, they see the party going toward "shrinking".

In all this movement one thing is not visible--possibly the most important: the change in the profile, in the new face of the Right or of the conservative camp in Greece. This can come about through evolution and also with the appropriate leaders.

New Party Reportedly Planned

Athens | VRADYNI TIS KYRIAKIS in Greek 21 Jul 85 pp 1-2

/Text/ A well-known newspaper organization in cooperation with another newspaper organization and with the knowledge and support of the government, is planning the creation of a new, small party willing to cooperate with PASOK in the context of a consensus approach. The overall effort is directed by a well-known publisher who played a role in the event of 1965.

The objective of this move, as revealed by | VRADYNI TIS KYRIAKIS, is to form a new party which will appear in the fall. This party will be used to weaken ND by taking a place between ND and PASOK.

According to reports, Premier Papandreou is familiar with these plans which he supports behind the scenes since he is told that if necessary this new party will be prepared to cooperate with PASOK.

The plan has been in the works for some time now but its implementation started after the election and the withdrawal from ND of deputy Dion. Livanos. The effort was also intensified after the withdrawal of Giannis Boutos from ND. It is interesting that the newspapers of the two pro-government organizations publish articles and interviews with these two deputies, presenting views designed to prepare the ground for a new political party while they offer the government "commitments" for cooperation.

Already officials of the one newspaper organization in discussions with ND deputies--especially younger ones--talk openly about this new party appearing. They try to attract "faithful ones" by using the argument that "there must be a new generation of politicians who started since 1974 so they are not responsible for the past of the two bourgeois parties" (meaning the National Radical Union /ERE/ and the Center Union.

The failure to attract ND cadres, let alone deputies, has not discouraged the "bridge makers." They argue that there are several cadres outside of parliament who will support the move. They include the names of former Agricultural Bank Governor (under ND) Ad. Pepelasis, Professor Koumandos, and politicians not included in the electoral lists (P. Gennimatas and others).

The plan includes an effort to undermine the ND unity by using personal attacks against ND leader Mitsotakis. Specifically, those behind the plan have chosen the method of mudslinging because they see that every effort to break up ND is futile since neither the grass roots nor the leading cadres are willing to play the PASOK game.

Thus, they consistently peddle the notion that Kon. Mitsotakis is trying to turn ND into his "personal fief," ignoring the fact that Mitsotakis himself decided right after the election to call a Party Congress which is its

highest organ. It is interesting to note that initially the pro-government newspapers tried to spread the report that the ND Congress was being postponed. Following the announcement of the Congress committees and the date (around the end of November) they changed the content of the rumors.

At the same time, knowing that the party rank and file are determined to continue the struggle for democracy--something the government particularly fears --they try to lead ND toward "inward looking" with rumors of break ups to prevent the activities of 41 percent of the Greek people. In this way they hope to add to their arguments the "stagnation" of ND and the effort to take away certain--younger at most--cadres to man the new party.

In any event, the entire effort seems to be failing since, according to reports, the staff preparation of ND has been completed and the great democratic camp is methodically and in a coordinated way passing into the offensive.

Old 'Vlakhou Plan' Revived

Athens KYRIAKATIKI ELEVTHEROITYPIA in Greek 22 Jul 85 p 8

/Article by Georgios Kassavetas: "Ominous Developments in ND"/

/Text/ As we start today, it is necessary to "connect with what we said before." In one of my commentaries just prior to the election I wrote:

"The overconcentration of the two gladiators (ND and PASOK) includes the prospect of their own decomposition. At this moment this may appear to be 'unrealistic' to those who share the fever of the duel. Possibly because they all believe that one party will win with small difference from the other, and we are going to have soon another duel with the same gladiators.

"But what if during the last days before the election a strong current develops in favor of one or the other party? What if on 3 June we have a strong majority of one or the other party? Then, the time will come for the decomposition of the other side. This decomposition will become even easier by the fact that its composition is the product of several different elements."

And now here I am, I, who opposed since 1974 every "prediction" concerning the forthcoming ND break up, see--for the first time and in spite of official declarations for unity--that the process of bisecting ND has already started.

The demise of the Center in a country with a petty bourgeois composition, a petty bourgeois economic mentality, and a way of thinking and ideology, was an artificial distortion of reality; an unnatural development which cannot last forever.

The main feature of the last election is not so much the shrinking of the Left--since PASOK, too, places itself to the Left--but the dominance of the ...non-existent Center. Because PASOK, too, made every effort to appear as the heir of the Center, as its chairman (Papandreou) abandoned the creator of scientific socialism Karl Marx--whose portrait decorated until recently the PASOK local offices. And ND on its part tried desperately to show itself as the continuation of the Center and especially of the liberals.

In reality, neither PASOK ceased being a party of the Left nor ND a party of the Right. But the accumulation of so many outside elements within the parties presages that neither PASOK will be free in the future from the phenomenon of desertions such as those of the first 4-year term, nor will ND assure its compact unity.

But initially I spoke of bisecting ND, not of a break up. This is because a process is under way which will take time to come to fruition. This process moves now toward the implementation of an old plan, known as the "Vlakhou Plan" because it was first proposed by KATHIMERINI publisher Eleni Vlakhou. This plan provides for the formation of two "kindred parties" out of ND--one clearly conservative, the other more progressive, and a more persuasive instrument to bring together the petty bourgeois voters who are dissatisfied with PASOK.

To the duo of G. Rallis and I. Boutos, who were thought at that time as the likely leaders, we have now added I. Pasmazoglou, V. Tsouderous, and possibly what is left of the Party of Democratic Socialism /KODISO/ under Kh. Protopapas.

The speedy expulsion of P. Gennimatas who was "Rallis' man" simply shows how well ND leader Mitsotakis understands this real problem. With this expulsion Mitsotakis tried quickly to make a show of power to any prospective centrists contemplating a flight from the party. He continued this tactic with the expulsion of G. Stefanakis.

In spite of the fact that the pro-government press overemphasizes a movement by Kostis Stefanopoulos as the leader of the "challengers", the implementation of the two kindred parties' plan, if it is ever pushed forward, will be realized by others--not even by Giannis Boutos. In any event, he himself spoke of the necessity of passing the torch to a younger generation.

In any event, the fact is that the present form of ND cannot go on for much longer. At the moment the search is on for the creator who will take a "rib" from his side and give it a new form. Obviously, the material is there. What is needed is the "life-giving breath."

ND Politicians Warned

Athens MESIMVRINI in Greek 22 Jul 85 p 6

/Article by Khr. Pasaiaris: "Let the Grumbling Stop Before the Rank and File Smash Everything!"

/Excerpts/ What is going on in ND? What more are we going to see and hear coming out from the ...upper floors /of the party headquarters/?

Its incurably optimistic leader is away on a visit to the U.S., from which he expects a great deal. It would be tactless to ask him questions while is unable to answer. Yet there are many burning questions--not only from us but mainly from the rank and file, the ignored, unrespected, unconsulted, but always ready to fight rank and file.

Mistakes, Mistakes, Mistakes...

In a few days Mitsotakis will complete 11 months as the ND leader. Everyone remembers he was elected last September with a large majority and mandate (and the hope) 'of crushing Andreas' because he was the only one capable of doing the job.

He worked hard with the absolute confidence that he was going to win the election and become premier. He put together a new declaration of principles and objectives; he placed his own people in key positions; he put much emphasis on the renewal of the party and to liberalism; he went from one end of Greece to the other; he defended himself as well as he could against the dirty war unleashed by Menios /Koutsogiorgas/; he engaged in a frenzy of activity (which also included many mistakes); but he did not crush Andreas.

Not only did he not crush Andreas, but he saw the PASOK strength remain at 46 percent, a percentage no one expected, a percentage that surprised even Papandreou himself.

Livanos, Stefanakis, Apostolakos, Boutos, Manolanos, Mikhaloliakos (and others from the ND top level who have not come out yet but who will declare their challenge soon) charged Mitsotakis with fatal mistakes, such as the unreserved acceptance of the electoral law, the position he took on the question of Sartzetakis, the upheaval he caused in the ND Youth Organization /ONNED/, the delay in launching the electoral campaign, the pressure he exerted on Karamanlis for a statement, his reluctance to renew the leadership, and his acceptance in advance of the legitimacy of the election. In other words, as though he knew Andreas was going to have another 4-year term!

Yet most of them acknowledge that no one could have done better. Not Averof, not Rallis, not Stefanopoulos, and of course not Boutos. We know well that all of them (including Karamanlis) were in agreement with what took place at least until the night of 1 June. Yet all were shocked by the electoral

results of the night of 2 June. Andreas won because he and his men played the game more cleverly, they were better even though they indulged in all kinds of dirty tricks.

After Mitsotakis, Who?

Now Mitsotakis resembles the general who won the battle but lost the war. And since with the exception of Karamanlis who went on to become president of the Republic--all ND leaders were decapitated after they lost the election. Mitsotakis, too, must put his neck under the guillotine, but who is to take over?

The people at the ND top levels seem to have lost every sense of reality. If the rank and file acted as they did, then the 41 percent of the voters would have become a pitiful mosaic of separate guerrilla bands of cooperating guerrilla leaders.

This is exactly what the other side wants. Yet the other side faces greater dangers of defections and desertions than what some ND "stuffed shirts" imagine. Secure as they are with their parliamentary deputy salaries (paid from the people's sweat) they develop theories, charge Mitsotakis with mistakes, criticize after the fact, and express dismay with the expression of the White Russian emigre who was destined to die with the Czar's image in his eyes, provided he did not overexert himself to defend him.

It is Not Their Property

Whether Mitsotakis is the ideal leader for the coming political struggles, only the immediate future will show. The ND Congress is not too far away. The ND base is rich, dynamic, gold bearing. New personalities, new fighters, new cadres will appear since the old generation must be placed one way or another to the shelf. Someone among these young people will be the enlightened popular leader and the future 35-year old premier.

In any event, all the great political leaders in Greece came out of this camp. This camp provided the cadres for all other parties, including PASOK, even the two communist parties.

Therefore, if the people of the top ND level have nothing better to do, they should at least stop the grumbling, the gossip, the tricks, the petty black-mailing, and the...fake importance.

They must understand that the party is not an inheritance they received from their father, nor a partnership of 5, 10 or 100 small businessmen of politics but the voice and the guide for 41 out of every 100 Greek voters.

And when these people get fed up with what their leaders are doing they are likely to go up some time to the top level and smash everything!

7520

CS0: 3521/317

POLITICAL

GREECE

RAPPROCHEMENT WITH ISRAEL SEEN IN NATIONAL INTEREST

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 25 Jul 85 p 4

/Article by Jean-Jose Cohen, AL HAMISHMAR correspondent in Athens/

/Text/ The most basic argument for Greece's policy vis-a-vis Israel insofar as the settlement of their diplomatic relations is concerned has always been the fear for Greek interests in the Arab World. One argument that was quite right, at least until just recently.

With tremendous shake-ups taking place in the Middle East, this argument does not hold up. For anyone who has just a little knowledge of the region, the recent events say much. With the agreement in principle between Arafat and Hussein, the new relationship between powers in the region has begun to assume flesh and blood, i.e. the Egypt-Israel-Jordan-Palestine-Iraq (yes, Iraq) axis that will, of course, have the blessing (and not only in words but financially) of the conservative Arab nations of the Persian Gulf, starting with Saudi Arabia. The objective of this axis will be to confront the two "most frightful evils" in the region: the expansionism of Russian influence and expansionism of Islam a la Khomeyni.

Greece, due to its frictions with Islamic Turkey, was not able to remain outside of these rearrangements. Having these facts in mind, it seems that the time has come for the Greek Government to normalize its relations with Israel, without any longer fearing for its interests in the Arab countries. (Since we are talking about interests in the Arab countries, experience shows that no one's nation that recognized Israel long after 1948 has had its interests with the Arab countries harmed).

There is also a more basic reason for which the time has come to normalize relations. Already, the strategic interests of both nations have begun to coincide more than at any other time and as the new alliances become a reality so will interests coincide. A recent example is Israel's pressure on Germany not to sell weapons to Turkey. It is almost certain that if there were normal relations between Greece and Israel the pressure would have been much greater and public and consequently more effective. As the government knows from the recall of its ambassador to the United Nations, namely Mr Doundas, Israel is concerned over the pro-Arab overtures by conservative Turkey and I imagine the same thing concerns Greece. Just on 25 January 1985, during his visit to Ankara, Libyan leader Colonel Qadhdhafi reconfirmed Libya's support on the Cyprus question (a simple reminder, only Israel and Algeria from the entire region immediately and without hesitation condemned Denktas' pseudo-state. Another example of strategic interests: Greece and Israel are the only

two states in the region that are not Islamic and as such the only ones that would be able to successfully resist the new wave of expanding Islamism a la Khomeyni. An expansionism with vast repercussions in the 1990 decade in politics, economy, energy, etc.

The question then is why does not normalization take place. In a discussion about a month ago with a person in the close entourage of Mr Papandreou, I was told (and I translate this very carefully) that the government does not normalize relations "because that is exactly what America is asking." To be very frank, I have difficulty in believing this because even if America is exerting pressure the criterion must be what is Greece's interest. And both in Greece and Israel what is of interest is not simply a normalization of relations but normalization as quickly as possible.

5671

CS0: 3521/ 325

POLITICAL

ICELAND

PAPER PRAISES ARRANGEMENT MADE WITH U.S. ON BASE SHIPPING

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 10 Aug 85 p 24

[Editorial: "The Bull Has Stopped Rolling in the Base Shipping"]

[Text] The governments of Iceland and the United States have now reached an agreement about the arrangement that will prevail in the shipping for the Iceland Defense Force at the Keflavik Naval Base. The shipping will be open to competition. In this way the main request of Icelandic authorities has been fulfilled; that is to maintain quality between the countries so that Icelandic shipping companies do not have to be put aside with reference to U.S. monopoly laws from 1904.

As soon as it became clear in the spring of 1984 that the U.S. shipping company Rainbow Navigation intended to claim all shipping for the Defense Force based on the U.S. monopoly law, Foreign Minister Geir Hallgrimsson took over the case. He has discussed the issue at numerous meetings with U.S. officials and more than once with the U.S. Secretary of State George Schultz. After the meeting of the ministers in Lissabon last May, the Americans hinted that perhaps it would be possible to allow Rainbow Navigation to continue the shipping under the cover of the monopoly law and make up the "loss" to the Icelandic shipping companies with some kind of compensation. This idea was immediately rejected by all Icelandic parties as it indeed is in total opposition to the basic ideas on which the defense cooperation between the nations is built.

Work continued on trying to solve the matter in a manner acceptable to the Icelanders. Recently, U.S. Secretary of the Navy John Lehman arrived in Iceland to, among other things, honor Marshall Brement, the departing U.S. ambassador, for work well preformed in the relations between the nations and the U.S. Navy. During this visit, Lehman also spoke with Foreign Minister Geir Hallgrimsson. It now comes to light that it is the Department of the Navy that feels that the shipping should be open to competition due to the high freight rates charged by Rainbow Navigation. There is every indication that it was during the talks with Lehman that the ice started to break and it is quite certain that Ambassador Brement worked on the solution of the matter up to the time he left the country last week and he deserves much of the credit for the fact that the ice started to break at last at the meeting

that was held in the Government House on Wednesday and Thursday. When Geir Hallgrimsson and George Schultz met in Helsinki last week, it came to light that one meeting in Reykjavik could make it possible to create the equality between the countries which the Icelanders have always claimed should prevail in this matter as well as others.

During the coming weeks and even months, the U.S. Department of the Navy will work on finalizing the terms of the competitive procurement. That is probably not an easy task in the technical sense and even less so in the political sense, as with the agreement with Iceland, U.S. authorities may be setting a precedent for shipping to other countries where U.S. military bases are located. The matter is also legally complicated. Instead of touching the monopoly law, the U.S. Government decided to apply the authority of the U.S. President to grant an exception from the monopoly provision of the law from 1904. Representatives of the Rainbow Navigation want, of course, to protect their monopoly position and say that they are now investigating a legal solution to curb the agreement that was announced in Reykjavik the day before yesterday. Spokesmen for the Icelandic shipping companies are pleased with the main outcome but understandably state that they will not issue any further statements until they see how the discussed competitive procurement and terms will be implemented.

It is, of course, debatable whether this is an important or significant issue. Such issues are, however, of no importance because the matter was like a snowball that could have activated an avalanche if it was not stopped. Under the leadership of Geir Hallgrimsson it has been possible to stop the ball. It is now in the hands of the U.S. Department of the Navy.

MORGUNBLADID is pleased with this conclusion of the discussion between the governments. The conclusion is in accordance with the tradition that has been created in the relations between Iceland and the United States for over 40 years; namely, if a matter of dispute arises, it should be solved by negotiations and agreements. This method is often time-consuming as democratic government practice always is, but it most definitely must not yield to unilateral statements and acts that often are based on nothing but the need to elevate one's own status at somebody else's cost.

9583

CSO: 3626/49

POLITICAL

ICELAND

USSR PROPAGANDA, FLEET EXERCISE SEEN HAVING MESSAGE FOR ICELAND

Novosti Attacks Pershing Support

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 16 Jul 85 p 26

[Editorial: "Soviet Propaganda"]

[Text] Last week it was reported that the Soviet representatives in the Arms Limitations Talks with the United States had changed their opposition to research being conducted on the space defense systems. This was considered to be great news as the Soviet propaganda machine has been used ceaselessly in recent months to elaborate the dangers of such research that now has begun in the United States. It was Leslie Gelb, the NEW YORK TIMES specialist in foreign affairs and security affairs, who first reported the changed Soviet stand on the Geneva talks. But this news did not remain undisputed for long. The Kremlin and its propagandists said that it was far from correct to say that they had changed their policy in this matter.

At a conference that was held on space defense in Stockholm recently, Soviet representatives admitted what has been known for a long time, namely that research connected with defense against missiles in space and on the ground has been conducted in the Soviet Union.

It has been pointed out here more than once that the Soviet fight against the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative only reminds one of the propaganda war which they launched after the foreign ministers of the NATO states decided to respond to the dangers from the Soviet SS-20 nuclear missiles with medium range U.S. missiles. What the Kremlin had in mind at that time was to get a grip on the Western Europe with a monopoly on medium range nuclear missiles.

In the propaganda war on the Euromissiles, the Soviets used the most amazing weapons. It was, for example, interesting to follow how more than once it was implied in propaganda brochures from the Soviet Embassy in Reykjavik that Iceland was connected with the NATO plans involving the U.S. missiles, Pershing 2 and the cruise missiles, in one way or another. It was exactly during these years that the opponents of Western defense in Iceland participated in this propaganda choir and said that the "nature" of the defense base in Keflavik was changing, if it had not already been completely changed; it is the "brain" in the NATO and U.S. nuclear plans in the North Atlantic.

No valid facts have been shown to support these statements on this issue, neither from the Soviet Embassy, APN or Icelandic spokesmen for the Kremlin. But now it is in fact Reagan's "Star Wars" that is the priority on the agenda of those who take the view that the armament and defense of the Western states are more dangerous to world peace than what the Soviets are doing in the military area. And lo and behold. In a mimeographed letter from APN (NOVOSTI) and NEWS FROM THE SOVIET UNION, the Soviet Embassy in Reykjavik has begun to distribute, it is reported that Iceland is connected with the "Star Wars" plan. How long will it be until this will be echoed in the message from the Icelandic spokesmen of the Kremlin?

Navy Would Threaten Country

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 24 Jul 85 p 28

[Editorial: "Soviet Naval Exercise"]

[Text] The Soviet naval exercise in the vicinity of Iceland is one of the clearest indications of the great emphasis the Kremlin has put on the buildup of military power which they can deploy to demonstrate their power anywhere in the world. In recent days, the Soviets have been engaged in naval exercise south, east and north of Iceland. Admiral Wesley L. McDonald, Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Northern Europe, has said that this exercise is probably the most extensive ever undertaken by the Soviets.

News of this exercise is rather sketchy. Although the Iceland Defense Force has been observing this exercise from the Keflavik Naval Base, it is difficult to obtain a total overview from there about what is going on. From the available sources, it can be concluded that a Soviet naval unit gathered south of Iceland or west of Ireland and sailed from there north through the so-called GIUK-gap. In the GIUK-gap, that is the ocean area between Iceland, Great Britain and Norway, the Soviets had positioned submarines to stop the naval unit. Another similar barrier was positioned further north. North of that barrier was the Soviet aircraft carrier Kiev along with support ships. In short, the Soviets were practicing in the Norwegian Sea how to block reinforcements from reaching Norway in times of danger and conflict. Further south in the Atlantic, the exercise also involved how to interdict the sea communication lanes between the United States and Western Europe which are the cornerstone of the NATO defense policy. Further north, another factor in the Soviet exercise was the defense of their nuclear submarines in the North Atlantic and the Arctic Ocean, as well as the defense of the gigantic naval bases on the Kola Peninsula around Murmansk.

When observing that the Soviet naval exercise originated considerably south of Iceland, one cannot but help wondering what role the country plays in this exercise due to its geographic location. Those who are best informed about the Soviet military policy have pointed out that at the outset of a conflict over control of the North Atlantic, the Soviet Army would try to invade Norway from the sea and gain control of at least the most northern part of Norway. In that the Soviet military command would gain a foothold close to the Norwegian Sea and would be able to provide air defense coverage for its fleet. It is also

predicted that at the outset, the Soviets would try to gain control of Iceland in one way or another even if it would only be to ensure that Soviet land combatants would not be attacked from here. Also it is considered likely that the Soviets will go to extreme measures to deactivate military installations in Scotland during the first stages of conflict.

Although it will probably be possible in the end to obtain reliable reports about where the Soviet warships and aircraft were seen in the air and on the surface of the sea during this massive exercise that now is being conducted, it will probably be difficult to discover where in the ocean depths the submarines were located during this exercise. This information is among the most sensitive military secrets in the Western countries. The greatest secret of the Soviets, however, is that during peacetime they have managed to arrange in the Western countries specially trained units that are ready for sabotage whenever the signal is given. Soviet refugees and others have reported on these units, the so-called Septnaz-units. The descriptions of the terrorists acts they are supposed to perform at the outset of conflict have caused widespread fear.

It is sheer naivete to suppose that Iceland is exempt from the Soviet Septmaz plans. However people view this matter, the conclusion has to be that it is of primary interest for the Soviets to gain control of Iceland immediately during the first stages of conflict but preferably, of course, before the onset of a conflict. The implementation of the naval exercise the Soviets are currently conducting confirms this view.

When discussing this issue, it is imperative, of course, that during peacetime measures be taken that ensure that a conflict will not occur. With that objective in mind, Iceland is a member of the Atlantic Alliance and is in a defense cooperation with the United States. Preventive defense measures are the safest way of averting danger, and that applies to both the existence and freedom of nations and individuals.

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CSO: 3626/45

POLITICAL

ICELAND

NORWEGIAN MEDIA PRAISES HALLGRIMSSON PERFORMANCE AT HELSINKI CSCE

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 3 Aug 85 p 1

[Article: "Norwegian Media on Geir Hallgrimsson's Speech in Helsinki:
'Stated Outright What Everybody Thinks'"]

[Text] Yesterday, Friday, Norwegian mass media reported on the speech Foreign Minister Geir Hallgrimsson delivered at a conference of 35 ministers from Europe and North America in Helsinki. The mass media concludes that Hallgrimsson was the only foreign minister beside U.S. Secretary of State Schultz who spoke openly.

The speech delivered by Norwegian Foreign Minister Sverre Strøm, who spoke after Hallgrimsson, was discussed. The speeches were compared and it was stated that Strøm had shown great caution and never mentioned the Soviet Union, and that his speech was in the same style as most of the other speeches. On the other hand, Geir Hallgrimsson said outright what every citizen of the free world thinks.

It was also mentioned that Geir Hallgrimsson was one of the two ministers attending this conference who signed the Helsinki Accords in 1975. For that reason his speech received great attention and it was not missed by anyone. Hallgrimsson criticized the Soviet Union and its satellites outright for violation of human rights and he cited the case of Andrei Sakharov as an example. He also said that the invasion of Afghanistan was a deplorable violation of the Helsinki Accords and that it called to mind in an alarming way events that took place in Czechoslovakia in 1948 and 1968 and in Hungary in 1956. In conclusion it is stated that Hallgrimsson had been very poetic in his description when he said that the years that had passed since the signing of the Helsinki Accords had not been as bright as people had hoped.

In the DAGBLADET and ADRESSEAVISEN it is reported that Norwegian Government officials had shrugged their shoulders when they were asked their opinion on Hallgrimsson's speech. Strøm agrees with him but had opted to use a milder tone as the Soviets would understand anyway what was being referred to. It is reported that Strøm went so far as to say that Geir Hallgrimsson and Schultz may have done Sakharov a disfavor by putting emphasis on his case in their speeches.

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CSO: 3626/49

POLITICAL

ICELAND

COLUMNIST REVIEWS CONTINUING PROBLEMS IN PEOPLE'S ALLIANCE

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 10 Aug 85 p 9

[Commentary by 'Staksteinar': "THJODVILJINN'S Disbelief in Government's Unpopularity"]

[Text] Ossur Skarphedinson, editor of THJODVILJINN, said in his newspaper last weekend: "If people think that the situation will improve by itself (insert: People's Alliance problems) only because of an increasing dissatisfaction with the government, then people simply do not understand that all conditions now have completely changed from the party's previous periods of difficulty." Staksteinar will now dip into these "completely changed conditions," namely the THJODVILJINN editor's disbelief in the government's unpopularity.

"Completely Changed Conditions"--Birds of a Feather Flock Together"

The THJODVILJINN editor says that "all conditions have completely changed from the party's previous periods of difficulty." i.e. the People's Alliance. He says verbatim:

"Firstly, the alternatives available to dissatisfied voters left of center are now more numerous than before:

"The Women's List has gained a fairly firm ground and although the composition of its following is obviously changing, it still remains a very attractive alternative for many radical women and obviously has a large share of the so-called loose following.

"The same applies to the Social Democratic Alliance. Despite the liberalism nuance, it nonetheless posed some attraction to a group of academics who previously were staunch supporters of the People's Alliance.

"Neither is there any need to remind people that the Social Democratic Party recently discovered a new feather in its cap at the same time that the People's Alliance has been losing support. It is obviously a cause for concern for many people that when the Social Democratic Party loses support, the People's Alliance does not reap the obvious benefits."

It is not just that the left-wing of Icelandic politics has been divided into many parties, as the editor correctly points out, but the People's Alliance itself, or what remains of it, has been split into fighting cliques that are involved in internal fighting days on end.

The affinity which the editor mentions between the four parties on the Left, nonetheless calls to mind that "birds of a feather flock together," It is quite interesting that he talks about the Women's List as "an attractive alternative for radical women." Well, so be it!

Editor's Great Disbelief

If people think that the situation (insert: in the People's Alliance) will improve by itself only by increasing dissatisfaction with the government, then people simply do not understand..., says the THJODVILJINN editor who probably understands quite well what is happening.

The editor, in fact, does not believe at all that the "government's unpopularity" will put the People's Alliance on even keel again, neither internally nor externally. Yes, the disbelief that the editor has in the "government's unpopularity" is great!

For 2 years now, THJODVILJINN has tried with all its might to keep the "unpopularity" question alive. The result of that effort is not great if any credence is to be put in the disbelief the editor expressed above.

The weapon which the People's Alliance has used to beat the government with, THJODVILJINN, proved not to have a very sharp edge. The same can be said about the party leadership and the parliamentary group. The shadow of the ministerial socialism 1978-1983 looms over the whole thing and does not make the phenomenon very attractive.

The fact is, that all other party policies on the Left benefit from the comparison with the People's Alliance. There is no party on the Left in such poor shape, despite everything, that it does not appear acceptable and becomes an "attractive alternative," to use the editor's words about the Women's List, compared to the People's Alliance.

Inheritors when the Game is Over

The editor of THJODVILJINN does not believe that the "government's unpopularity" will lead the People's Alliance out of its self-made problem situation. "It makes no sense at all to intend to sit idle and wait it out," he says, "to expect that the situation will improve just by itself without any discussion and effort. We must look around in all directions and try to understand what went amiss."

For whom are these words intended? The party leadership? The parliamentary group? Or is the THJODVILJINN itself perhaps the "scarecrow" that plagues the party? The cliques in the People's Alliance will be fighting fiercely about that until the next elections. The Militant Socialist (Fylkingin), brought into the party by Svavar Gestsson, keeps the fires going. They plan to be the inheritors when the game is over.

9583
CSO: 3626/49

POLITICAL

NORWAY

WILLOCH GOVERNMENT GAINS FAVOR AS ELECTION NEARS

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 1 Aug 85 p 3

[Article by Bjorn Talen: "Growing Support for Willoch Government"]

[Text] The Willoch government is gaining popularity. Last year, a clear majority was dissatisfied with the government's performance. However, the attitude has changed and more people are now favoring the nonsocialist coalition government. According to a regular Gallup/NOI poll for AFTENPOSTEN, some 47 percent of those questioned were satisfied with the government's performance, 43 percent dissatisfied and 10 percent did not know.

A majority of the voters similarly approved of the government's performance prior to the 1983 local elections, but then there was a distinct turnabout and the bottom was reached last November when the figures were 50 to 37 in the government's disfavor. About midwinter, voter attitude had changed once more and the figures were about even. Now it seems like the government is riding a wave of popularity with a clear majority of voter satisfaction among those polled.

More Men

Men are somewhat more satisfied with the government than are women and it also scores highest among voters in the age groups under 30 and between 45 and 60. Voters in South and West Norway are most satisfied, while the attitude among voters in Trondelag/North Norway is clearly negative. Government popularity rises with income, even more so with education and, not surprisingly, Conservative Party voters are most satisfied with the Willoch government, followed by Center and Christian People's Party voters. There is also satisfaction among Progressive Party voters, while Liberal Party voters are dissatisfied, although not nearly as much as Labor and Socialist Left Party voters.


However, when we look at the changes, the picture becomes quite different. The government's popularity has actually risen the least among Conservative and Labor Party voters, while the big breakthrough has been among Progressive, Liberal and Christian People's Party voters. The government popularity development among Center and Socialist Left Party voters has been about the same as among the population in general.

The government has gained the most popularity among very young voters in South and West Norway, low income people and the highly educated. Trondelag/ North Norway, on the other hand, is as gloomy a coast for the government as it was before.

This poll was taken in June and, as usual, included about 1,000 persons.

Parties First

We have made another interesting observation by comparing this popularity poll with the regular NOI (Norwegian Opinion Institute) party barometer, showing government parties' support. In both instances, the government and the coalition parties were at a low point last year. But the surprising thing is that the gain in popularity showed up first in the party barometer. Normally, one would think that growing support for the government parties would be the result of people thinking the government was doing a good job. Actually, it looks like the voters are reacting in a reverse order: First comes confidence in the government parties, followed by a positive attitude toward the government's work.



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CSO: 3639/148

POLITICAL

NORWAY

ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, FOREIGN POLICY SEEN BOOSTING WILLOCH

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 3 Aug 85 p 3

[Article by Einar Solvoll: "Labor Party, Against Wind, Jumps Gun on Electoral Race"]

[Text] The Willoch government is flying with a tail wind. This has not made the opposition parties less "keen" to take over power in the fall election. But the party leadership has problems in explaining to voters that the time is ripe for a new political leadership of the country. Similarly, for the nonsocialists, there is no one who dares anticipate the winner. Despite economic growth, increasingly lower unemployment and foreign policy triumphs which the nonsocialist government has had recently, the outcome of the election is wide open. It has happened before that the victor was taken for granted, only to see on election day that voters wanted something else.

"Everything succeeds for this government," Trygve Lie said when Crown Prince Harald was born just after Johan Nygaardsvold came to power. The electoral strategists on Youngstorv are not quite as satisfied this time around, as the country experiences growth and progress. The following commentary by the nonsocialist leaders is particularly "well drummed" into the heads of thousands of electoral workers who want to oust coalition cabinet ministers from their seats:

"There's good news and there's bad news for the Labor Party. First the good news: the party's electoral promise, 'New growth for Norway,' has already been fulfilled. Now the bad news: it was the Willoch government that saw to its fulfillment."

Unsuccessful Agitation

Things are not better with agitation about unemployment under a nonsocialist administration. It is openly acknowledged at Labor Party headquarters that this agitation misfired. "We must 'throw coal' into other furnaces," it is said, and old age care and health and social policy in particular are mentioned. As far as unemployment and economic growth are concerned, party

spokesmen believe that these brighter prospects will now be only a transitory phenomenon. They will worsen, so it is said, after election day on 9 September. But this is clearly not happening either.

A Choice of Values

This much, however, is clear: once again the main figures in the parliamentary election race will be Prime Minister Kare Willoch and his challenger Gro Harlem Brundtland, even if they do not want to meet in nearly as many duels as they did in 1981. Furthermore, we are being faced with a choice of values -- this the Labor Party leader herself has emphasized. In this election the Conservative and Labor Parties will set the main trends.

Begins Tomorrow

The official start of the political campaign for all political parties will be during the week of 12 August, when people are back from vacation and just before schools reopen. But the Labor Party's electoral campaign machine will gear up as early as tomorrow. In fact, this year the Labor Party will open its electoral campaign in Sweden, at a border rally in Stromstad with Olof Palmer, the Swedish prime minister, who will kick off his electoral campaign at the same time. After a church service and a family rally in Stromstad, Gro Harlem Brundtland will take Palmer on board a boat with her and will cross the border at Halden. There will be a Norwegian/Swedish family meeting at the Fredriksten fortress. Age Aleksandersen will entertain after the two have spoken to the people.

At the end of next week, the Labor Party's leader will leave on a longer, 4-day electoral campaign tour through Finmark, Troms and Nordland before the party's official start of its electoral campaign on Youngstorv, with waving banners and flags and Gro Harlem Brundtland as main speaker; former Prime Minister Einar Gerhardsen will also be present.

At the Momarked

The official beginning of the Conservatives' electoral campaign will be Monday, 12 August despite the fact that for several weeks party chairman Erling Norvik and other main party figures have been going along the coast in the electoral boat "the Conservative Wave." At that time all Conservative cabinet members, members of Parliament, and local party chairmen -- some 400 people in all -- will meet at the SAS hotel in Oslo for a final polishing, with an executive meeting to follow afterwards. It will be very much like a "small national convention." Most people will not get to be present at this meeting. They will, however, be able to watch Prime Minister Willoch on television when he opens the year's exhibit at the Momarked on 25 August; but by then the electoral campaign will be on in earnest, on radio and television as well.

70-cm Jump

If an elector comes upon a person who is trying to jump over a crossbar set 70 cm above the ground, then that elector can be quite certain he has seen a

Center Party politician out fishing for votes. It should not really be so difficult, but on the other hand there are reports from the party office that the jump crossbar is correspondingly short.

The Center Party has set itself the goal of getting over 7 percent in this year's election, after it experienced sorry Gallup figures in the area of 5 and 6 percent during the greater part of last year. For this reason, as a symbol, the party has chosen to bet on a 70 cm "high jump," something most ought to be able to manage.

The official opening of the party's electoral campaign will take place at Hellerud Fields in Skedsmo on 18 August, the same place where Agriculture Week is usually held. In preparation is a mass rally with party chairman Johan J. Jakobsen at the midpoint. For families on that day, there will be a chance to go on a horseback ride -- and Jakobsen will certainly let himself be photographed on a shining white horse if photographers ask for it. The party's more serious message to voters is "Put all of Norway to use," and this includes continued shoring up of employment, environmental protection, business and trade and local politics.

Airplane Surprise

One day after 12 August, Mr and Mrs Eriksen will take a domestic air flight on Braathen's South American and Far East Air Transport. Mr Eriksen has had the first beer of the day and is eagerly awaiting the airline's box lunch. It comes and is opened. Inside the cardboard box he suddenly discovers mottos encouraging a vote for the Christian People's Party. This will perhaps be the biggest surprise of the electoral campaign for many people. The Christian People's Party will kick off its electoral campaign on Wednesday, 14 August in Stavanger. The party has also rented a boat, similar to the Conservative and the Progressive Parties. The Christian People's Party's boat will leave Fredrikstad on 15 August and go around the whole coast during the course of the electoral campaign.

The party's motto, as it has been many times before, is "Unifying around values," but this year there is also "Increased effort for new jobs" and "We're betting on the family."

Spikersuppa

The Progressive Party will officially open its electoral campaign at Spikersuppa in Oslo in two weeks on 17 August. With the help of a large wide screen above the stage, passerby on Karl Johan will be shown everything that is going on down on the platform. For 4 hours, Carl I. Hagen and his closest collaborators will try to engage people in conversation from his place behind the microphone -- and all of this will be transmitted over local Oslo radio. All of this will later be shown as a video film with "Dynasty" as a symbol, and it is hardly any surprise that the main characters in the film are identical with the best known people in the Progressive Party, with music from the Denver series in the background. The goal of the Progressive Party is to get more people into Parliament, to the

"dynasty" there, to quote the film's message. The film will be shown in most of the country's secondary schools. The party has obtained 500 copies for itself for this purpose.

Tomorrow Odd Einar Dorum (Liberal Party), Hanna Kvanmo (Socialist Left Party) and Carl I. Hagen will face off in an electoral duel at Orland near Trondheim as a prelude to the official electoral campaign. The official start of the electoral campaign of the Socialist Left Party will be on Thursday, 13 August in Hedmark, while the opening shot of the Liberal Party will be three days later in Bergen. The biggest Liberal public relations venture during this year's electoral campaign will be a collection for the drought victims of Africa, and representatives will go around with boxes, collecting the first of the million kroner the party has promised for this purpose.

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CSO: 3639/149

POLITICAL

NORWAY

POLL SHOWS LABOR PARTY PLATFORM STILL LAGGING IN APPEAL

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 9 Aug 85 p 3

[Article by Alf Seeland: "Clear Message In Gallup/NOI Poll: Labor Party's Voter Guarantee Being Rejected"]

[Text] The so-called voter guarantee of the Labor Party has gotten a severe setback: voters believe it will bring about increased inflation, and with such an effect, there is no wish to have the Labor Party concept executed. The reaction is unambiguous in all parts of the country, and even among the Labor Party's own voters there is skepticism within a significant minority. Given this fact, the effect of this opposition party "flagship issue" on the electoral campaign can be seriously questioned.

The cold shower for the Labor Party emerges from a Gallup/NOI opinion poll conducted for the Conservative Party press. The question refers to the Labor Party's guarantee to carry out certain social and industrial policy measures if the party is reelected to power. The other parties have stated that this will bring about increased inflation, something the Labor Party denies. Those polled are therefore asked to give their opinion.

Great Fear

Thirty-seven percent of those polled believe that the Labor Party's concept will bring about increased inflation, 26 percent believe it will not, and 38 percent have no opinion. The response "increased inflation" predominates in all parties except the Labor Party itself and the Socialist Left Party. But even in these parties, 19 and 14 percent respectively believe there will be increased inflation, and under half believe there will be no such result from the "voter guarantee," something even Gallup/NOI points out in its commentaries.

One Exception

In all breakdowns of the survey there are more who believe in increased inflation with one sole exception: people in thinly populated areas. In those areas the responses are balanced. Belief in inflation is greatest in the country's three largest cities, with 44 percent. The opposition also counted on garnering the most voters in those areas. It is also worth noting that groups under 30 years old do not differ from other voters, but that women represent 48 percent of the no opinion group. However, the Labor Party will

presumably bridle at the following: 32 percent of Norwegian Federation of Trade Union members believe in increased inflation; only 36 percent trust the opposition party's rejection of the assertion.

Inflation Unwanted

Matters get even more serious for the Labor Party when voters are asked to what extent they want the party's measures executed if more price increases result. Forty-four percent answer no, 25 percent want the "voter guarantee" carried out no matter what, while 31 percent have no opinion. On this matter Gro Harlem Brundtland's party is getting a reaction from a good 29 percent of its own voters and support from only 44 percent. With the parties in the government and the Progressive Party the matter is clear; only a few percent wanted increased inflation.

The matter-of-fact opinion poll institute comments laconically on this finding: "It may be the case that as time has gone by inflation is something people have come to have greater respect for. If that is true, then this can present an obstacle for movements at the extremes of the mass of voters which would lead to a change of government."

In all Groups

Where the approach to this problem is concerned, the picture is unambiguous in all breakdowns of the survey, and even in thinly populated areas there is now a majority against the Labor Party measure. The greatest fear of the effects of inflation is to be found in the age group 45 years and older, with 48 percent. Young voters as well are clear in their opinion: 42 percent will not hear of increased inflation.

Since every third voter has no opinion on this question, it will be exciting to see whether the Labor Party abandons its assertion to the effect that increased inflation will not result and instead conducts an electoral campaign on the premise that a higher rise in prices is something which can be tolerated. If so, then the party will have difficulties, as only 40 percent of Norwegian Federation of Trade Union members accept this, while 36 percent will have nothing of increased inflation.

Opposition Increases

For its third part, Gallup/NOI looked separately at that group -- 37 percent which believes in increased inflation. A good 71 percent of those replied that the "voter guarantee" should not be carried out, 21 percent gave an affirmative response, while 8 percent had no opinion. Among its own voters the Labor Party continues to receive support from 63 percent of these, while 27 percent of Labor Party voters who believe in increased inflation do not support it, and for Norwegian Federation of Trade Union members this holds for a good 38 percent. There is also a defection among Socialist Left Party voters: 56 percent do not want to have the Labor Party package carried out.

The opinion poll was conducted in June, when the Labor Party's "voter guarantee" was fresh and the party was pushing it most energetically.

Labor Party Commentary

Commenting to NORPRESS, Ivar Leveraas, the secretary of the Labor Party, said that he does not see anything sensational in the survey result:

"It is rather encouraging that more than half of those queried do not have a clear understanding of this issue," Leveraas said, and pointed out that together the "no opinion group" and the "don't bring about increased inflation group" comprise 63 percent.

"When we launched our voter guarantee, the overwhelming nonsocialist reaction was 'higher bid and inflation creating.' Since then we have used new forces to demonstrate that the voter guarantee is supported in terms of economics and that it does not have the inflation-driving effect which the nonsocialists are screaming about," Leveraas stated.

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CSO: 3639/150

POLITICAL

NORWAY

SVENN STRAY EXPLAINS HIS 'QUIET DIPLOMACY'

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 3 Aug 85 p 2

[Op Ed Article by Foreign Minister Sverre Stray: "Quiet Diplomacy Works"]

[Text] In connection with three current cases, German Lionel, Knihinicki and Bertelsen, solutions have been reached on difficult and sensitive issues in relation to three very dissimilar countries: Libya, with its radical Islamic orientation, Warsaw Pact member Poland and our NATO ally Turkey. In all three cases, so-called "quiet diplomacy" is credited with having brought about a solution.

In this connection, there is the impression that some believe that so-called "quiet diplomacy" is a new creation. It is the reverse which is true. "Quiet diplomacy" belongs to those original and traditional forms of relations between countries, with emphasis on confidential contact and discussions.

For a long time it was also the most utilized method, and it is still so as far as everyday diplomatic matters are concerned.

Open Diplomacy

But conditions today are quite different when matters of national significance or matters which attract major public attention are concerned. In such matters, "open diplomacy" is now customary.

This is related to the fact that foreign policy questions occupy us all, while previously it was largely a field for governments and experts. This is closely related to the development of the new media, which has made it possible for all people to keep themselves informed about practically all issues.

It is also a link in the democratization process which characterizes the last 200 years. Today it is essential for authorities both to keep people informed and to create the greatest possible general consensus about the decisions which are taken. In foreign policy matters this does not apply only to one's own people. The influence of world opinion has become an important aspect.

No one in our country would disagree that it is proper for foreign policy to be democratized. However, it should be clear that, where relations between countries or matters which must be treated across national borders are concerned, application of "open diplomacy" in many instances can make it more difficult to achieve a good result.

Megaphone Diplomacy

The most extreme form of open diplomacy is what is often referred to as "megaphone diplomacy," in which the parties loudly hurl points of view, frequently accusations, at one another without any type of discussion going on. This form of diplomacy is seldom or never used by Norway.

Between the extremes represented by "quiet diplomacy" and "megaphone diplomacy" there is a wide area of forms of contact and discussion with varying degrees of confidentiality and openness. The choice of the way to proceed will be a question of which method under given circumstances is considered to be the one best suited to lead to the desired result.

Not Pure

However, in practice there is seldom or never talk about a choice between pure "quiet diplomacy" or "open diplomacy." Often matters are involved which, from the beginning, are the object of intense media interest and in which the role of Norway for that reason is followed with great attention. But at the same time it is clear that in matters of a particularly sensitive nature it will be important to behave in such a way that national prestige does not become involved, something which always makes things difficult and which can often prevent rational solutions.

Most particularly in human rights cases which involve a single person or family, we have seen that it is easier to arrive at solutions through "quiet diplomacy," and thus avoid situations in which the handling of a case is solved strictly on the basis of principle and prestige.

Combination

A second matter is that such issues can often be profitably treated through a combination of "open" and "quiet diplomacy" in which, for example, human rights issued in multilateral forums are addressed by phrases of principle and specific cases are addressed in more confidential ways in bilateral contacts with the country with which you have an unsolved issue. On the other hand, there will also be instances in which the chances of getting a matter solved through confidential contact must be seen as so limited that the only practical way of proceeding is to create the greatest possible attention around the matter.

Another combination which has often proved useful is to generate strong official opinion about a matter while the foreign service employs "quiet diplomacy." The authorities of the other concerned state can then approve

the called for solution out of a wish to improve bilateral relations, but without having its people get the impression that the state has caved in to pressure from another state.

In human rights cases, consideration of the affected individuals will be of decisive importance in choosing a method. The aim must be to use the procedure which gives the hope of a solution and which contains the least possible danger that negative effects will be stirred up for the individuals concerned as a consequence of the case's having been brought up.

Result-Oriented

It must be stated clearly in this connection that in those instances in which "quiet diplomacy" is chosen, it is not as a consequence of any wish to keep contacts secret, but only out of a realization of what in a given situation is the most appropriate in order to achieve a desired result.

Furthermore there is still a main rule that contacts and discussions through diplomatic channels will be of a confidential nature in case nothing else is agreed upon. This will always be an important prerequisite to ensure a necessary degree of confidence and genuine discussion between states. In this connection classical, traditional diplomacy has preserved its validity for the solution of difficult issues in relations between states.

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CSO: 3639/149

POLITICAL

NORWAY

HAGEN IN PRESS CONFERENCE DISCUSSES CAMPAIGN GOALS

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 3 Aug 85 p 8

[Article by Carsten Carlsen: "In Pivotal Position for Progressive Party: Carl I. Hagen Has Faith in Understanding After Election"]

[Text] "Our stated goal is to be in a pivotal position after the election. Should this occur, I am convinced that very quickly discussions will get under way whose aim will be reaching an understanding with us."

Carl I. Hagen, chairman of the Progressive Party, stated yet again during a press conference in Oslo yesterday that a pivotal position in this year's election is his party's fondest wish. At the same time he repeated that the Progressive Party will never aid in allowing Gro Harlem Brundtland to slip into the government building. He was unwilling to accept the fact that, by issuing such a guarantee the party would be castrating itself politically.

"Such a guarantee holds only if the alternative to today's government is a socialist government. It does not hold if the coalition falls apart and in its place we can have, for example, a pure conservative government. In the event we agree with the Labor Party, the Socialist Left Party and the Liberal Party and do not agree with the government on an individual matter, we will decide in conformity with our conviction unless a vote of confidence on a bill is brought up. And then it will be a vote of confidence presented by the prime minister from the speaker's chair in Parliament and not, for example, a vote of confidence presented by Jo Benkow in the press. In such a situation, the entire Norwegian people will understand that it is a government issue and not the individual matter we then decide on. Any nonsocialist government whatsoever is to be preferred to a government led by Gro Harlem Brundtland, and that is more important than the outcome of individual matters," Hagen said.

Replying to the question as to whether this did not mean that only a nonsocialist government could demand a vote of confidence and thereby render the Progressive Party harmless, Hagen said that he did not think so.

"My faith in political responsibility is such, and I know Kare Willoch so well, that I know he will not demand votes of confidence three times a week." the party chairman stated.

Hagen admitted that his party prefers a pure conservative government to a three-party government. Nevertheless he said that the Progressive Party will certainly not advocate sowing dissension among the parties in the government.

"We shall not do as Gro Harlem Brundtland -- creating conflicts. I reckon the parties of the middle will manage that themselves," Hagen said. He found it worthy of note that the leaders of the middle parties have not responded to his encouragement to come up with the sort of explanatory guarantee such as the one his party made.

The Progressive Party held its central executive meeting yesterday. At that time resolutions supporting the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to rock star Bob Geldorf, the strengthening of the police and the competitive power of business and trade were adopted. Also adopted was a resolution which expressed revulsion at the harassment to which Iranian refugees in Denmark have been subject.

In addition the party has sent a letter to Prime Minister Kare Willoch in order to have issues of tax policy clarified, and one to Erling Norvik, the chairman of the conservatives. In the letter Norvik is encouraged to stop asking Progressive Party voters to vote conservative for tactical reasons.

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CSO: 3639/149

POLITICAL

NORWAY

CABLE CUTTING SEEN RELATED TO TENSION WITH USSR OVER BARENTS SEA

Zurich NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG in German 17 Jul 85 p 3

[Article: "NATO's Sensitive Northern Flank. The Barents Sea As a Source Of Tension. The Most Recent Soviet-Norwegian Sea Incident."; passages enclosed in slantlines in boldface]

[Text] Stockholm, 14 July--Oslo is puzzling over the background of an incident in the Barents Sea. Last Thursday night, a Soviet navy vessel cut a marked cable being used for seismic investigations by a Norwegian ship that was taking measurements /in international waters/, but over Norway's continental shelf, north of Kirkenes in the Varanger Fjord. The /sharp protest/ that was immediately delivered to the Soviet embassy indicates that Oslo views this incident, which they characterized as "serious," as a deliberate provocation. In contrast to this, Oslo had spoken of a "mistake" when, five weeks ago, a Soviet fishing cutter sailed over a similar measuring cable and so destroyed it. This time, there was all the less reason for restraint, since the weather was good in the northern sea and the scientific team warned the Soviet vessel in Russian over the ship's radio and fired off signal rockets.

The incident is delicate because the /continental shelf/ in the Barents Sea between the two neighboring countries is /not definitively delineated/: Moscow wants to divide it in their favor along a sector line, Oslo follows international conventions corresponding to the midline principle. With the help of State Secretary Treholt, now a convicted traitor, an agreement was reached in the 1970's concerning a provisional /"gray zone"/ for the fishing industry, under which the Soviet Union and Norway would have equal rights in one part of the disputed area.

Military and Raw-Materials Strategy

The most recent incident took place unambiguously over a part of the continental shelf to which the Soviets had never previously laid claim. This has already led, in the separate media, to /speculation/ that the cable cutting signals an expansion of Soviet claims to the continental shelf. There appears to be no further basis for this political explanation; Norway has more indications that the Soviet Union wishes to establish a /condominium/ over the "gray zone" in the Barents Sea. Nevertheless, this episode is more difficult for Oslo than those that can be passed off as "mistakes;" it is part of the bewildering mosaic of "unfriendly acts" and offers for better cooperation (like those for

"treaties of consultation" in the 1970's). The Soviet strategy and tactics towards Norway may be primarily determined by considerations of /politics and security/. Norway forms the shoulder of NATO's northern flank at the exit for Soviet naval forces (above all submarines) from the Kola peninsula through the Barents and Norwegian Seas into the Atlantic; this little country is thus a cornerstone in the security of the North Atlantic lines of communication and supply, upon which it is in turn itself dependent.

Thus, the /raw materials potential/ of the area can be connected with the incident. The geological formations, to the extent they are currently known, give promise of large deposits of oil, gas and minerals. While their exploitation is a matter of the next century, the technical know-how and development potential is currently almost entirely in the hands of the Norwegians. For this reason, one naturally suspects that the seismographic equipment that was cut in the most recent incident, and then fished out of the water by the Russians, represents /precious know-how/ to the Soviets. Viewed in this manner, the incident could be a act of piracy in the cause of industrial espionage.

Sharp Public Attacks

Long-time former Foreign Minister /Frydenlund/ writes in his memoirs that Soviet diplomatic tactics towards Norway in the 1970's were characterized by an alternation between "warm and cold showers" and that the intervals between harsh verbal attacks and expressing satisfaction with the development of bilateral relations were often short, that both could in fact be applied at the same time. In the 1980's, however, the /"warm showers"/ seem to have become /less frequent/. In the first half of this year alone, detailed and sharp attacks by a Soviet ambassador, PRAVDA and by a Soviet author were quoted in a Finnish newspaper.

What these three biased portrayals of Norway's security policy have in common is that they claim that northern Norway is being used increasingly for NATO espionage activities against the Soviet armed forces on the /Kola/ peninsula and that the American fleet's visits to harbors of both the northern European members of the alliance represent a "clandestine basing of nuclear weapons." From this it follows, according to Soviet portrayals, that the "Nordic freedom from nuclear weapons" is being undermined. The charge of espionage in the Soviet accusations could be useful in analyzing last week's incident: If the Red fleet wants to protect itself against /electronic surveillance/, they are also going to cut seismic measuring cables that they see as "spy devices." This would be a military explanation of the incident.

Distortions

The first of the three verbal attacks against Norway was a speech at the end of February by the Soviet ambassador to Finland, /Sobolew/, who claimed that the recent large NATO maneuvers on land and sea in the northern regions were "difficult to differentiate from war preparations." The usual insinuations about an alleged /American "nuclear imperialism"/ surfaced again in a PRAVDA article at the end of April and in a Finnish daily paper in May. Sobolew and PRAVDA implied that Denmark and Norway were risking their peace-time freedom from nuclear weapons by allowing "visits by the American army, air force and navy," which amounts to a "clandestine nuclearization" of their territories.

In this way, it is said, the governments of both countries are hindering in particular, the guarantee of a /nuclear-free zone in northern Europe/, to which the Soviet Union also wants to contribute. Thus, a successfully warmed up instrument of propaganda is being used, in whose reintroduction into public discussion in the Nordic countries /Arne Treholt/ played a key role in 1980. The PRAVDA article includes the piquant claim that the American submarine fleet, in particular, had concealed itself, ready for action, in the fjords of northern Norway. From Oslo, however, the reports continue of underwater hunts in the deep fjords for boats that could not be from a NATO country...

The article printed in the Finnish centrist paper KESKISUOMALAINEN, stemming from the pen of the mysterious Soviet (or Finnish?) writer who appears under the nom de plume of /"Juri Kommissarow"/, is directed towards the Finnish reader at least as much as towards the Norwegian. Time and time again, "Kommissarow" expresses opinions in the Finnish papers that are formed in the International Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPSU. He enumerates Norway's military efforts in recent years, the storage of heavy material for the Americans, British and Canadians, as well as the construction of new radar installations and the surveillance by air with Orion and Awacs airplanes. "Kommissarow" does not, of course, write that these were /moderated NATO reactions/, which took place only after years of internal political tug-of-war, to the massive military build-up of Soviet forces around Murmansk on the Kola peninsula. Without doubt, the article wants to make Finns aware of what "danger from the West" threatens them, and so remind them of their duty, within the framework of the Soviet-Finnish mutual assistance pact, to counter attacks against the Soviet Union via Finland. At the same time, "Kommissarow" makes clear the fragility of Nordic cooperation, which is especially important to Finland as a spiritual and cultural tie to the West.

Composure in Oslo

In Oslo, people in leading political circles characterize the Soviet verbal attacks as /"a ritual"/ to which they have grown accustomed. This composure is no pose, but it is only part of the picture. Norway expects--on the basis of a long and puritanically held favorite illusion--that as a small country, they will of course be affected by the trials and tribulations of global politics, but that they really cannot do anything about it since their own influence means nothing in power politics. With respect to their own defense efforts, the /Willock government/ has nevertheless determined time and time again that more is politically feasible and achievable than was previously assumed, and they have managed a real increase of more than three percent in the appropriate budget.

In terms of the politics of raw materials, they have also been awakened from the pleasant dreams of a supposedly unimportant oil producer. When, however, /Sheik Yamani/ went to the trouble of personally coming to Oslo late last fall to discuss Norwegian manipulation of the spot market, many politicians became aware, for the first time, that even a small country has influence and a corresponding responsibility. A /"Commission for the Northern Region"/, which should be more flexible than the ministerial bureaucracies, was set up this spring better coordinate all legal issues and issues pertaining to defense, industrial, regional and raw-materials policy. One of the commission's tasks

is a neighborly relationship with the Soviet Union. The relationship to the Russian bear remains particularly delicate, because their all-powerful neighbor certainly regards an incident that is serious in Oslo's eyes as a mere trifle.

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CSO: 3620/423

POLITICAL

SWEDEN

ADELSOHN LIKELY PRIME MINISTER IF NONSOCIALISTS WIN

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 3 Aug 85 p 3

[Commentary by Morten Fyhn: "'Sound Common Sense' Must Take Over Power in Sweden"]

[Text] "A wave of freedom is breaking over Sweden," says Ulf Adelsohn, the man who can become Sweden's first conservative prime minister since 1930. What does he stand for? A change in the system, he himself states. Welfare will continue, but power will be wrested from the state and politicians. Collectivization has gone too far. It is time for individual people to decide about their lives instead of being directed by conference resolutions. "Call it a change in the system if you will. But I'm speaking rather about sound common sense, Adelsohn explains.

Despite wrangling and fighting, personal clashes and an electoral campaign without a common platform, the three nonsocialist opposition parties in Sweden are nevertheless in agreement about two things: if together they receive a majority in Parliament after the 15 September election, they will do their utmost to put together a three-party government consisting of the Moderate Coalition, and Center and Liberal Parties. And if this succeeds, Ulf Adelsohn, the conservative' chairman, will become Sweden's prime minister after Olof Palme.

Falldin Supports

Only a few years ago, a member of the Conservative Party as head of government was next to unthinkable in Sweden. For example, as late as the spring of 1981, hardly any political observer would have believed that then Prime Minister Thorbjorn Falldin 4 years later would actively advocate a new, broad coalition and unconditionally accept the conservative leader as the common prime minister candidate. But that is what happened. That this same Falldin would make it clear at the same time that a new coalition with Adelsohn as prime minister would certainly not conduct conservative policy is another matter.

The 1980's appear to be the moderates' decade in Sweden. In the 1970's the Center Party was the leading nonsocialist party, and earlier the Liberal Party dominated nonsocialist politics. This model is known from other

countries. This time around we will concentrate on the political message of the Moderate Coalition Party in this year's electoral campaign.

Further to Right

The Moderate Coalition Party does not have the same clear social policy as the Norwegian Conservative Party. The moderates speak more often and louder about the need to reduce the number of recipients of social assistance than about the need of the needy for public help. The party is so busy reducing state bureaucracy, errors and shortages in the state, counties and cities, together with use of tax money, that it can easily be understood to be opposed to everything, something indignant party spokesmen deny when they are confronted with such assertions. An explanation of the party's great progress lies completely in the way the many myths and feelings of dissatisfaction which exist in people have been exploited and turned into the main elements in the party's own policy.

Alternative

In a recent extensive speech, his first since vacation, Ulf Adelsohn drew up lines for the Moderate Coalition Party's policy during the electoral campaign. His main message was that "sound common sense" must rule Sweden. In an almost slogan-like form he expressed what the party views as "sound common sense," an alternative policy to "many years of deliberate collectivization and politicization of our country." According to Adelsohn, "sound common sense" is the following:

It is necessary to save in a national budget which shows a 70-billion kroner deficit even under good economic conditions.

In one of the world's richest countries, someone who works full time should be able to live on his wages.

The person who does extra work or who gets a salary increase should notice this in his pocketbook even after taxes are paid.

Sweden will stop the socialist experiment of having union funds take over industrial concerns.

For that matter, no one will be collectively affiliated to a political party or an insurance company.

Sweden's assistance to developing countries will go to the world's poor and not to countries that wage war.

Swedish families themselves can decide how their children are to be looked after when they are small, which doctor and dentist they will go to, how they will live and which television channels they will watch.

Schools will give students grades as a "receipt" for what they have learned.

These are the political contents which Ulf Adelsohn gives to the wave of freedom he believes is breaking over the country. "Our opponents are screaming about our suggestions. They call sound common sense a 'change in the system' and a threat to the 'People's Home.' Those who see these alterations as a threat are the ones who see their special interests endangered and who do not want to see their power, their monopolies, their state appropriations or their privileges changed," party chairman Adelsohn believes.

Property Law

The Moderate Coalition Party wants to have competition and new thinking. Monopolies will be broken up, property law strengthened and marginal taxed reduced. "A marginal tax reform is about the right to be able to stand on one's own feet, about being able to take responsibility for oneself and for others," Adelsohn says. As far as solidarity with the weak is concerned, he believes that people have seen through the myth that calls for two-thirds of what a man earns being administered by politicians.

Adelsohn offers an alternative to the social democratic movement, to the "brotherhood of power," to even greater social democratic concentration of power: "We want to spread all this power to people and families. Privileges for politicians and representatives will become rights for families. What is today frequently a congress resolution will instead be decisions which each and every person makes himself at home, in his own living room."

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CSO: 3639/149

POLITICAL

SWEDEN

PAPER DEPLORES WESTERBERG CAMPAIGN ATTACK

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 10 Aug 85 p 2

[Editorial: "A Broadside Against the Left"]

[Text] When Liberal Party leader Bengt Westerberg spoke in Almedalen in July he was staking out boundaries. He was trying to clarify what it was that separated the Liberal Party from the other parties, both on the right and on the left.

That led to several plain remarks against the Conservatives. Westerberg gave examples of Conservative policies which he considered unacceptable, such as cuts in foreign aid and the state contribution to schools for the handicapped. The Conservatives' insistence on demands for changes in the system have also caused resistance in the other nonsocialist parties.

But when Ulf Adelsohn speaks now he uses some restraint: "It is not a change in the system that the Conservatives require, but sound common sense." And with the Liberal Party's election prelude in Goteborg on Friday it was Bengt Westerberg's turn: "No more remarks against the Conservatives--nor against the Center Party either."

He launched a single broadside against the Social Democrats and the society that they created. Westerberg called it "the society of distrust." He described the Liberal society as "the society of confidence." In the press conference which preceded the speech he emphasized how important it is to designate the Social Democrats as the main opponent.

It appears that Christian Democratic Party leader Alf Svensson was successful when from the rostrum in Almedalen he lectured his nonsocialist big brother for appearing to split the parties, because each party was trying to put the best face on itself. At the press conference Westerberg said that he did not need to repeat his criticism of the Conservatives. People remember. But some sort of correction had taken place in the leadership--at the last moment, and possibly too late.

Bengt Westerberg said at the press conference that there are great possibilities for reaching agreement with the Center and Conservative Parties, not

only on the wage earner funds, but also on eliminating the tax on working capital in small business, reducing income tax and family policy. But it is clear that these would require concessions from the Center Party--the Liberal Party's and Conservative Party's proposals for economic support for families with children are fairly similar.

Westerberg attacked the Social Democrats on well-known themes: the wage earner funds, property taxes, choice of doctors, child care and political party. These are the same demands which the Conservatives go around with. Adelson calls it freedom, Westerberg calls it confidence. Old messages, but still new--Bengt Westerberg dressed them in new but rather unattractive sentimentality.

The gloomy Social Democrat view is contrasted against the Liberal Party's bright humanitarian view. Then there should be distrust of the people who are behind the structure of public health care, dental care and child care. Distrust of whom?

In the society of distrust the monopoly will decide what the individual will see on TV, said Westerberg. There will be one more button to push if we get a third advertising-financed TV channel, as the Liberal Party wants.

It is proceeding as usual: when the election temperature rises, the arguments sink lower. Most recently in Marstrand Westerberg sought a much more nuanced picture of reality.

One of Bengt Westerberg's main messages is that welfare will not grow with a monopoly, and that a market economy is--and has always been--a precondition for welfare. Future welfare can be saved through economies now. The Liberal Party wants to save 20 billion. That means reduced state contributions to municipalities, reduced housing subsidies and higher rents, and a reduction of health insurance benefits.

But whoever has government power after the election is going to be forced to economize. Social Democrats also. Westerberg promised strong measures to put order into the Swedish economy. It will be no easy educational job to explain why economic sacrifices are required from the citizens. It is not as easy as just distrust or confidence.

It is not difficult to agree with Westerberg that the ability of people for renewal and development must be utilized. Creative power exists, and not just in private alternatives. Above all that power must be brought forth in the hardening public care system. Bengt Westerberg gives an example of how a single initiative at the Hudiksvall Hospital led to life-care fit for human habitation.

It is mostly the more concrete alternatives of the opposition which have been noted so far in the election debate. It should continue to be so. Mainly because the Social Democrats only have one simple and wornout message--that we are on the right way. And that, of course, depends entirely on where we are going.

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CSO: 3650/314

POLITICAL

SWEDEN

PAPER VIEWS 'NORMALIZING' IN SWEDISH, SOVIET RELATIONS

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 8 Aug 85 p 2

[Editorial: "'Normalization' Outward and Inward"]

[Text] The invitation for Olof Palme to visit the leaders in Moscow, which First Vice Foreign Minister Viktor Maltsev had in his baggage, and its positive reception shows that relations between Sweden and the Soviet Union are returning to normal. On the Swedish side it appears that all quarters are ready to welcome this development.

The view has spread that a small country encounters great difficulties in the long run if its relations with a neighboring superpower are frozen. As to the border agreements in the Baltic, trade, fishing rights and refugees, the dialogue must be able to continue. That is in the national interest, as the prime minister has often pointed out.

It is part of the rules of the game to say that relations will develop with mutual respect and with regard to the territorial integrity of both countries. What this can be worth in practice was recently demonstrated when a Lithuanian refugee was brought into Swedish territorial waters by a fishing boat. It should not be forgotten that the freeze in Swedish-Soviet relations was caused by the submarine violations in which it was the official Swedish view that the Soviets were responsible. The fact that the violations continued, even though no violating nations could be identified, meant that doubts could be raised about Soviet respect and consideration.

"We are on the way toward normal relations," also said Deputy Foreign Minister Pierre Schori in summarizing the results of Maltsev's visit. He diluted it by calling the temperature of the relations between the two countries "normal." That can be understood, since the improvements which Schori could point out are fairly modest: increased trade during 1985, resumed talks on Baltic boundaries, hope for Soviet support for the Swedish claims for salmon quotas. Clearly Schori did not say that the most important change was that the government is now reevaluating open relations with the Soviet Union. and that that is being noted with approval in Moscow.

It is good that there has been a real step in resuming exchange of visits. To state the Swedish positions in direct conversations, and when necessary to protest against transgressions--such as the Soviets' inhuman detention of Estonian refugees Valdo Randperes and Leila Millner's daughter Kaisa--is hoped to be more effective than a freeze, and in any case does less damage. The submarine violations should be regarded as a military problem rather than diplomatic--and should be considered serious when it comes to the debate on future defense appropriations.

The Defense Committee is the forum in which the domestic problems in the security policy can to a certain extent be solved. In an interview in DAGENS EKO Olof Palme referred to the committee as the place for the Conservatives to support the government's security policy, and said that that party regrets the haste of the no-confidence resolution against Lennart Bodstrom. Ulf Adelsohn's careful comments in connection with Maltsev's visit and about the Moscow invitation to Palme also indicates that before the election the Conservatives prefer to keep a low profile on security policy--and also that they have no more serious objections to raise.

Palme is therefore not showing any more conciliatory approach toward his domestic political opponents: he expresses his satisfaction that the Conservatives rallied behind his government and refrained from adventurism. But in response to a direct question he is not ready to soften his judgment about that party if it threatens neutrality and thereby peace.

Olof Palme deserves to be believed when he claims that he is not trying to pick a fight on security policy in the election campaign. He seems to have followed that intention so far during his current round of speeches. But when the government is working so hard for normalization abroad, it should be able to spend some time on reduction of tensions at home.

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CSO: 3650/314

MILITARY

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

FRANCO-GERMAN ANTITANK HELICOPTER PROGRESS REVIEWED

Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German Jun 85 pp 61-65

[Article by Lt Col Wolfram Hoffmann, project director in the Air Force General Staff: "The PAH-2 Weapons System--First-Year Balance"]

[Text] The PAH-2 weapons system entered the developmental phase on 29 May 1984 with the governmental agreement covering the German-French HAP/PAH-2/HAC 3G helicopter program. In the beginning, prerequisites for an orderly progress of developments had to be created: a management organization, design and detail specification. Concomitantly, considerations designed to simplify the program were going on and conversations were initiated regarding the participation of additional partners. Initial developmental results substantiate the utilization of modern technology. Lt Col Wolfram Hoffmann of the General Staff Service, who is the project director in the Air Force General Staff, reports on the status of his weapons system in the following contribution.

With the beginning of developmental work involved in the PAH-2 weapons system, it was necessary to first build up the management organization both in industry and at the customer level, the only vaguely defined project had to be rendered more precise and the desirable activities involved in development had to be subjected to key planning through to the series production stage. Following 6 years of investigating the concept and cooperation models, it was important to find a transition toward coordinated detail work across the entire breadth of a complicated weapons system. This step was successful; the learning process connected with it is still ongoing. Euphoric plans for working out detailed specifications have to be corrected. The framework for realizing the weapons system with respect to timing, costs and technical parameters will not be firmed up until the end of 1985 when the total specifications and the subsequently negotiated main development contracts are in hand. Success of the development is dependent upon the ability of industry to convert new technologies into a functioning system, as well as on the readiness of the German and French partners to subordinate national interests to the common goal.

Where does the weapons system stand today?

The Concept

The concept for the PAH-2 calls for an antitank helicopter of the 5-ton class, which is armed with antitank rockets and air-to-air missiles and vision technology in the bow. It was specified in a national phase document (MTWF) and agreed upon in an accord with France.

With respect to the vision technology, there is preference for a European version (EUROVISIONIK) provided this system can acceptably compete with respect to timeliness and costs and capacity with the already series-produced U.S. TADS/PNVS system.

The requirement for competitive types of vision technology in a U.S.-proposed instrument configuration resulted in interface problems which threatened to block the specification of a basic helicopter and the mission equipment package. With the decision to decouple the EUROVISIONIK from the U.S. system, a solution is indicated which meets both the requirements for competition, reduces the risk and provides a fall-back position by way of the U.S. system and also meets the demands of German industry to give the demanding but risk-heavy European development a realistic chance. It is intended to develop the anti-tank helicopter as planned with the TADS/PNVS system as the PAH-2(A) and then to equip another German prototype with the EUROVISIONIK mounted in the French mast version as the PAH-2(E). Details are currently being negotiated with the French partners and with industry.

With this step, the military is sticking with its own planning and gains an option for yet another concept--at unaltered costs--with decisions on the series production of this design not possible until hardware can be evaluated.

Army aviation is now confronted with the task of adapting employment concepts and combat procedures to the strength of the night combat-capable weapons system--agility, firepower, duration of employment and stability--in such a way that the PAH-2 can become the massed-fire weapon at the disposal of the commanding general. Over and above the experiences gathered with the PAH-1, keen imagination, agility and open-mindedness with respect to the equipment are required.

Management Organization

Following the issuance of the armaments agreement, national management of the PAH-2 project is accomplished by the Working Group of the Project Director within the Federal Ministry of Defense through authorized representatives from the departments of the ministry, from the Air Force Office, from the General Army Office and from the Bundeswehr Procurement Office. The national position which is worked out and coordinated by that body is defended in the Steering Committee for the Bilateral HAP/PAH-2/HAC 3G Program by the speaker of the German delegation, the branch chief in the Rue IV Department of the Federal Ministry of Defense. This steering committee can avail itself of the services of the harmonizing committee and of the subgroups "Training" and "Logistics" for purposes of coordinating details and preparing decisions. A military committee will shortly take up its activities as a forum for the special coordination of concepts expressed by the army staffs of both nations.

On the basis of the governmental agreement and jointly adopted resolutions, the steering committee guides and controls the Bundeswehr Procurement Office as the action component which reports to the steering committee on program progress periodically. The representative of the action component for the implementation of the bilateral total program in pilot form is the German design representative who is simultaneously responsible to the working group of the project director for the national technical/economic portion of the PAH-2 weapons system. For purposes of conducting technical dialogue and contract negotiations with industry, this individual has the use of a design team which has, in the meantime, learned to work together perfectly, with which he also coordinates the specialized reports from the Bundeswehr Procurement Office and uses specialized working groups to provide decisions on technical details of implementation, together with the project director who is responsible for the military component and with specialists from the General Army Office, the Air Force Office and the Materiel Command. The French side is represented by a liaison officer at the action component. Over and above this, the project director is in close contact with his colleagues who are responsible for French matters at the central level.


Whereas the steering committee dealt with the topic of "Visionik" at the beginning of the cooperation, in addition to questions of organization, procedure, employment, governmental agreement and coordination of military requirements, it now sees itself facing problems of the actual development of the helicopter. In a similar manner, the focal point of the action component is shifting from contractual structures, financial matters and industrial organization to technical questions of systems layout.

Personal acquaintances and familiarity with routine have improved cooperation in the bilateral organization of the customer component. Conversation partners on the part of industry are primarily the program management of the MBB Enterprise as general contractor and the management of the power plant manufacturer. Representatives of the cosupplier--the Aerospatiale Enterprise--participate in the program management of the general contractor.

The integrated management organization of the general contractor plans, guides, coordinates and supervises all industrial activity for the total project such as systems architecture, specification, integration and testing, specifications for all subsystems and component groups and their documentation, development of peripheral equipment, as well as contractual matters. Thus, it is of outstanding significance with respect to the success of the entire project.

Planning

Systems planning is used to depict the orderly course of all work all the way through the beginning of PAH-2 procurement according to capacities, time and costs and the compatibility of system segment planning, that is to say, the military segment and the technical-economic segment. The technical-economic planning is still a preliminary contribution which must be actualized by the action component as soon as the results of the "planning and specifications" contracts are in hand. With this proviso the systems structural plan was approved by the working group of the project director.



Bilateral control of the HAP/PAH-2/HAC 3G helicopter program; the steering committee decides, the other committees and groups are used for coordination and for preparing decisions.

Key: 1. Steering committee 4. Logistics
 2. Military committee 5. Harmonizing committee
 3. Training


In its elements, the structural plan is cost-oriented and compatible with cost-accounting practices in industry. It thus permits the assignment of median starting costs to each working packet of the project and the control of actual costs over the course of the development. With the help of automatic data processing it is possible to keep an eye on the financial situation and to rapidly counter allowances from the maximum limits of developmental costs.

The systems network plan reflects the timely course of development with its large number of individual processes in their relationship and time. It points to critical paths and makes it possible to compute planning models. Since the planning of the weapons system was assigned a firm target date, through the decision regarding the beginning of its series production and, on the other hand, realistic time frames had to be conceded for the individual development projects irrespective of a goal, the efforts now concentrate on bringing the network plan and progress concept iteratively to a final usable format. In doing so it will be seen under what kind of marginal conditions the goal of "series beginning by end of 1992," which was set on the basis of supplier bids from 1983, can be maintained.

For purposes of model calculations and to write the systems planning document the project director avails himself of the support of the IABG Enterprise, which is neutral with respect to the PAH-2 project, whereas the systems officer is aided by planning personnel from the general Air Force Armaments Agency in doing his military implementation planning. The action component, on the other hand, because of its close dialogue with industry, directly utilizes the planning of the general contractor in order to use it for its own implementation purposes after examination.

The planning is intended to limit a day-to-day management method to a minimum and to provide a topical and sound foundation for decisions. Toward this end, planning must be able to react rapidly without any major costs so as not to be overtaken by events and to prevent the planning apparatus from degenerating into a group of self-employed people engaged in reconstruction. In this respect, the PAH-2 planning component has yet to face the acid test.

In order to maintain the bilateral timing plan, development had to be initiated without delay following the conclusion of the governmental agreement. On the other hand, the weapons system was not so far defined that developmental goals and systems contractual matters had been confirmed for each subsystem. The contract form pointed to a way out of this bind: the main development contracts for the fabrication of prototypes are preceded by contracts for "planning and specification" and "development of time-critical components." For contracts covering the basic helicopter and the mission armaments package, the supplier is the general contractor; for the power plant, it is the joint company of the MTM, the MTU power plant manufacturer and the TURBOMECA Enterprise. Subsystems as a component of the basic helicopter are put out for bids by the general contractor.



"Reassessment" of the basic helicopter over the course of 1 year.

First Development Results

As a first step, it was possible to conclude the contract for the "planning and specification of the basic helicopter" on 21 December 1984. The appropriate contract for the power plant followed in March 1985.

A deadline shift of 6 months was indicated since there were startup difficulties, coordination problems involving specification of the subsystems, as well as conceptual differences with regard to systems architecture, all of which led to delays.

The "bid specifications" for the subsystems are partially completed, including those for COM/NAV, the data bus and for flight control; or they are currently being completed by the general contractor. After being released by the action component, they form the basis for the request for proposal, the results of which must be in hand in time to be included in the principal development contracts by the end of 1985.

A program review in March of 1985 was meant to be the first output verification of the general contractor. It transpired that industry is promoting the utilization of modern technology, for example, the use of the FEL principle for the main rotor and the use of fiber compound materials. Proposals involving a cockpit and operations monitoring and diagnostic facility are adequate to meet military requirements. Considerable results were demonstrated by the helicopter manufacturing firms in the utilization of advanced profile theories for the design and fabrication of rotor blades.

On the other hand, the proposal of a computer-based helicopter management system (MIL STD 1553 B) still has problems. This key helicopter element affects the coordinated interplay of all subsystems and determines the man-machine dialogue. It is an essential factor in the capacity of the weapons system. Work involved in the area of "service regulations for the weapons system" is breaking new ground. Added to this is the fact that the integration of basic helicopters with mission armaments packages in three different national helicopter versions places unusually high demands on the development of software. The general contractor, sub-suppliers and officialdom are particularly challenged by this subsystem. A "software tool" for development, design status identification and maintenance/modification will make service regulation management easier.

The object of additional efforts on the part of the general contractor at present are the areas of mass balance, location of the center of gravity and weight ratios. Calculations made by the general contractor in this area have to withstand a dialogue with specialists from the Bundeswehr Procurement Agency and military specialists.


Before embarking on the costly development of time-critical components and before conclusion of the main development contracts, the compatibility of all subsystems and components must be proven in an overall specification. The general contractor intends to make this area the point of his main effort in development.

Participation of Additional Partners

Great Britain has decided not to participate in the HAP/PAH-2/HAC 3G program following trilateral conversations on the ministerial level and between the helicopter manufacturing firms of the three countries.

In the meantime, the Netherlands have entered upon negotiations toward a governmental agreement. After detailed information regarding the three helicopter versions, they tend to favor the PAH-2(A) version with the Visionik facility in the bow. Currently, special Dutch desires with respect to armament and other equipment, as well as Dutch concepts of participation on the part of their industries in a cooperative venture, are being examined.


The contract partners of Germany and France remain open to the participation of third countries in the joint program. According to its structure--individual armaments version of the same basic helicopter--the program is particularly suited to take the interests of various European nations into account. Consequently, participation by additional partners is conceivable even during the course of the advanced development phase.



The FEL rotor principle.

- Key:
1. Hub
 2. Blade angle bearing
 3. Centrifugal force mounting
 4. Blade
 5. FVW plates
 6. Two maintenance-free elastomer bearings
 7. Conical elastomer bearing
 8. FVW flexible component

Bus subsystem architecture
(MIL-STD-1553B/STANAG 3838)



*REMOTE TERMINAL UNIT
**REMOTE TERMINAL

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MILITARY

DENMARK

DEFENSE STAFF CHIEF DESIGNATE LYNG ON BUDGET, MANPOWER, ROLE

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 6 Jul 85 p 6

[Article by Nils Eric Boesgaard: "Armed Forces Staff Chief Designate: Apathy Can Cost Us Peace and Freedom"]

[Text] Colonel Jørgen Lyng: "We still have a credible defense system, but at any cost we must avoid our allies' writing us off as the NATO defense chain's weak link."

"If a nation places anything higher than freedom it will lose its freedom-- and the ironic thing is that if it is comfort or money which is placed highest, then it will also be lost."

The quote was taken from British author Somerset Maugham [as published] by the Armed Forces Staff chief designate, Colonel Jørgen Lyng, who here, in a conversation with BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, warns Danes against sinking into apathy with respect to defense.

Colonel Lyng is replacing Vice-Admiral S.E. Thiede when he on 1 December takes over the post of armed forces chief from General O.K. Lind. The post of Armed Forces Staff chief is the next highest in the Danish peacetime armed forces. It is the staff chief who, as the name implies, is chief of the Armed Forces Command's seven staffs and who from a purely practical viewpoint enacts the armed forces chief's decisions and he together with the armed forces chief is the defense minister's most important adviser in, for example, drafts for new armed forces compromises.

Peace Keeping Element

Jørgen Lyng began his military service when he was called up to do his compulsory military service in 1952 and he has since tried a little of everything. He has been a member of the Chasseur Corps, company commander in the Zealand Life Regiment and an employee of the Armed Forces Staff. At the moment he is a colonel and staff chief with the Jutland Division in Fredericia. A job which must be attended to at the same time as he prepares himself for appointment as Armed Forces Staff chief and lieutenant general.

"I regard the Danish armed forces as constituting a peace keeping element which contributes to strengthening stability in Europe and which acts as an instrument for the Danish government's security policy, which now, as it has been up to now, is sheerly defensive."

"As far as armed forces expenditures are concerned, they must be regarded primarily as a kind of insurance premium which is paid in order to ensure our freedom and in the extreme case our existence as an independent state," Colonel Lyng says.

"The defense capacity which we have must of course be put in relation to the resources which a potential attacker, if the occasion should arise, will be able to spare to bring into action against our part of Europe. If this potential attacker's resources are modernized, we must try to follow suit, if not at the same pace, then, however, to a reasonable extent."

"One problem in connection with maintenance of the necessary defense capacity is that we have a considerably lower defense budget than the countries which we like to compare ourselves with--Norway, Holland, Belgium and alliance-free Sweden."

"This is the most important reason for the shortcomings which characterize the armed forces today, first and foremost in the form of failing supplies of up-to-date materiel and stockpiles of war ammunition which will make it possible to hold out until reinforcements from our allies get through."

The Draftees are Positive

Colonel Lyng was occupied in detail with the armed forces' personnel problems, and states:

"I put my trust in the fact that the ideas being entertained at the moment regarding a new training and personnel structure for the officer corps will result in strengthening of our good regular officer corps, so that this important precondition for efficiency in the armed forces is there."

"Incidentally, I consider the improved recruitment of reserve officers as something gratifying, not only for the armed forces but also--because of the good leadership training--for the community as a whole."

"If we look at the regular personnel, they have hardly ever been of a better professional level. As far as draftees are concerned, they are more positive than 15 years ago, and the selective lengthening of the training period will make it possible to reach a justifiable level of training both for combat troops and the corps of engineers."

"It is my opinion that the Danish armed forces have credibility today," Colonel Lyng says, whose appointment marks a generation shift in the Danish armed forces leadership, and who appears predestined with time to succeed Admiral Thiede as armed forces chief.

"It will be the politicians', the armed forces leadership's and the ordinary Dane's duty to ensure that this will also be the case in the future," he says, and concludes:

"It is important that we do not gain the title of being the weakest link in the NATO defense system, which stretches from North Norway to the Mediterranean."

"We must and can have a 'holdout time' of the same duration as our neighbors."

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CSO: 3613/164

MILITARY

DENMARK

PAPER AGREES WITH MINISTER ON NEED TO FIND SAVINGS

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 29 Jun 85 p 8

[Editorial: "Armed Forces' Economy"]

[Text] The Danish armed forces have economic living conditions which are different in several points from what holds true for other public institutions. Firstly, it is a distinctive feature that the total armed forces expenditures are agreed on in the form of an armed forces compromise which has a term of until the end of 1987. This means security for operations, but it also means that during the compromise period there are no realistic opportunities to carry out major changes in what was agreed on. Secondly, the armed forces have the problem that salary expenditures are an extremely heavy item in the total budget, compared with the situation in other countries. Both draftees and regular personnel receive a salary which gives them a considerable income advantage both in comparison with NATO countries and in Scandinavian terms. Whereas in many other public institutions it can be a problem to carry out necessary personnel reductions in pace with an adjustment of the public economy, it one of the armed forces' problems that within the existing salary limits there is no possibility of calling up the number of draftees which really should be called up.

The armed forces are a very large institution which annually purchases materiel to the tune of somewhat over two billion kroner. It has a training operation which is large, because the quite short service term necessitates intensive training, both of the various troop categories and of noncommissioned officers and officers, all of whom must be able to measure up to foreign soldiers. In these areas constraints have been placed on the already not impressive armed forces budget, which make it necessary to display a considerable eagerness to save in order to get the money to stretch.

The money /must/ [in italics] stretch, for that is the armed forces compromise's demand on the armed forces leadership. The leadership can assemble good arguments for the fact that the overall ceilings must be lifted when a new armed forces compromise is prepared and enacted. It will not be difficult to find such arguments and they should be able to make an impression on the politicians. But precisely in order to be able to make an impression it must be a precondition that doubt cannot be raised regarding what is justifiable businesswise in the present operations. The armed forces' people must in

light of this agree with the defense minister that any possible saving in the various purchasing areas must be looked into. A step has now been taken toward this through the further schooling of the people who administer the armed forces' purchasing.

They can also regard it as a considerable contribution to the Danish armed forces' political credibility that they get the services to function as a modern business conducted according to modern business principles.

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CSO: 3613/164

MILITARY

DENMARK

NAVY GETTING 'WORLD'S MOST ADVANCED SHIP,' STANDARD FLEX 300

Entirely Danish Project

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 30 Jun 85 p 17

[Article by Nils Eric Boesgaard: "World's Most Advanced Ships for Navy"]

[Text] The development of the new Standard Flex 300 ships with interchangeable arms and functions is being followed with interest by the large naval nations.

The Danish navy can look forward to getting some of the world's most advanced vessels when the plans for the Standard Flex 300 are now implemented, says the chief of the Navy Materiel Command, Rear Admiral H.D. Hansen, after the Finance Committee now finally has appropriated money for the project.

The Flex boats will replace a number of older vessels, including motor torpedo boats of the *Søløven* [Sea Lion] class, patrol vessels of the *Sund* [Sound] class and *Daphne* patrol vessels.

The new ships are to be built of a glass-fiber-reinforced plastic material and it is the intention that the Danish main contractor will have the first hull built at the Swedish navy's shipyard. Who the main contractor will be is still uncertain, but the competition is between the Frederikshavn, Aalborg and Svendborg shipyards.

"It is the Karlskrona Shipyard which developed the special GRP (glass-fiber-reinforced plastic) sandwich method, which can be used for larger ships," Navy Materiel Command Engineer Kai Gregersen relates. "The hull is constructed without a real mold, out of plates of a foam plastic material which afterward is covered on the outside and inside with glass fiber plates which are cemented firmly with a polyester resin, a synthetic material which is produced in Denmark and which up to now has been used largely for smaller vessels."

"It is the plan to build, first of all, seven or eight vessels and then some more, so that we will come to 16 vessels," the rear admiral says.

Many Functions

The Standard Flex 300 boats cost 190 million kroner apiece. By comparison, the new French-Belgian-British minesweeper class costs 350 million to 400 million kroner apiece.

The new boats will have, as the name suggests, a displacement of 300 tons. They will each be outfitted with a 76-mm fully automatic gun, but over and above this their functions will be able to be varied by means of a number of components which are mounted in openings in the hull and are connected by a quite simple system of plugs.

This concerns the ships' function as patrol vessels for watching over sovereignty in peace time, mine laying or mine sweeping in a crisis situation, and complete arming for battleships in a war situation, in which, in addition to the gun, they will be outfitted with eight Harpoon missiles, two torpedo tubes for target-seeking torpedoes, and a light antiaircraft missile system.

A Totally Danish Project

"None of the components are larger than that they can be brought on board by means of a mobile crane in any Danish provincial port whatsoever," Engineer Gregersen says, and adds:

"It will take a maximum of nine hours to change a Standard Flex boat from a patrol vessel into a battleship, and that is a fantastically short time when one takes into consideration that the replacement of a weapons system in a ship normally takes weeks or months."

The Standard Flex class is a totally Danish project, and its implementation is anticipated with great interest among our NATO allies, so great that the German navy at the moment has a representative going to the Navy Materiel Command in Holmen in order to follow the development.

A busy time is ahead for the Navy Materiel Command, first and foremost with the entering of the many agreements in connection with the building, accommodation and arming of the Flex boats.

Inspection Ships

But in addition there is the Folketing's decision regarding speeding the construction of two new fishery inspection ships for the waters off Greenland. The final order for planning the ships is still not at hand, but the need does not take SMK [Navy Materiel Command] by surprise, which has known for a long time that the old ships of the Hvidbjørnen [White Bear] class faced replacement, and which for this reason of course has entertained certain ideas--on paper, too. Ideas which have been reflected in the sketch which BERLINGSKE TIDENDE is publishing today for the first time.

Under discussion are ships of 2500 tons with a top speed of 22 knots and reinforced against ice so they can cope with all weather conditions in the waters around Greenland.

Rear Admiral H.D. Hansen reports that the ships will come to cost between 300 million and 350 million kroner apiece and that he estimates that the materiel command's designers will get under way with the detail design in the course of the fall. In the best case, the first of the new fishery inspection ships should be ready to depart for its operation zone off Greenland in the course of 1988.

Unjustified Criticism

"The Navy Materiel Command is a big shop," the rear admiral declared, who is a little tired of the, in his opinion, unjustified criticism which from time to time pops up in the media via the national auditors' reports.

"For example, I can mention that the National Auditing Office during its examination of 5400 travel accounts signed only 13, and that we ultimately, from a budget of six million kroner, had to pay back only 370 kroner."

"The same situation holds true for our purchases," the rear admiral says, and adds: "In the latest period we made 16,300 purchases and in the process entered into 56 major contracts for 900 million kroner. This provided an occasion for 58 remarks from the national auditors. This is nothing worth writing home about if one compares our business with, for example, a large private firm."

Development, Building Described

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 7 Jul 85 p 18

[Article by Nils Eric Boesgaard: "Navy's New Ships Being Built Here: Swedish and Danish Design"]

[Text] The Swedish navy's dockyard in Karlskrona is building the world's most advanced plastic ships and will now show Danish shipbuilders how they will create a new generation of ships for the navy.

Karlskrona. The Swedish navy's dockyard in Karlskrona was established at the end of the 1600's in order to build ships, to fight the Danes and, not least, Peter Tordenskjold.

Today it is in full swing with building the first of the Danish navy's new Standard Flex 300 plastic boats.

The naval base and dockyard became world famous when the Russian Whiskey-class U-137 submarine in the fall of 1981 went aground in the skerries a couple of sea miles out, during a spying expedition--an episode which nobody who visits Karlskrona is allowed to forget. It has been immortalized both on postcards and in the form of horrible plastic and ceramic submarine souvenirs.

It is summer vacation at the shipyard off the blue skerries shimmering in the sun. Only one place are they working energetically. This is in the carpentry shop where they are in full swing with constructing patterns for the Flex

boats. "We got under way the same day the Finance Committee's acceptance occurred, and the first 16 are already standing against the wall in the hall-- but about 100 will be used," Technical Director Bertil Blomstergren relates.

Biggest Plastic Boats up to Now

It is the Karlskrona Shipyard, which developed the advanced technology, which is to be used for construction of the new Danish warships which are to replace a long list of the navy's ageing and useless units. It is the idea that the boats by means of interchangeable components will be able to be used for a number of purposes, so that a very high degree of utilization will be gained. The vessels will be the largest the shipyard has built up to now. With their 56 meters, they will be a whole eight meters longer than the Swedish navy's new minesweepers of the Landsort [Province] class.

The use of a glass-fiber-reinforced plastic material for shipbuilding has been known for a number of years but has been employed chiefly for small boats and pleasure craft. It is first in recent years that they have begun to experiment with larger vessels. In addition to the Karlskrona Shipyard, it has especially been the Americans, British and Italians who have experimented, but they all used the same method as in the molding of small boats. That is, they constructed gigantic enormously expensive stainless steel molds in which it has been possible to mold, for example, 600-ton minesweepers.


"A completely different route was taken at Karlskrona," Director Blomstergren relates. "This has been possible first and foremost because it was possible to perfect the glass fiber sandwich system, on the basis of a very strong and porous and, therefore, light spacing material, which constitutes the middle layer of the hull's plating."

"It is this material which has made it possible to build large plastic ships without molds. We base it instead on a relatively simple positive wooden pattern on which the spacing material is first placed and formed. When this is in place, a 15- to 20-mm-thick layer of polyester-resin-soaked glass fiber mats is added on the outside. As soon as the plastic has hardened, the whole business is turned by means of a large crane, after which the wooden skeleton is taken out and the inside of the hull is covered with glass fibers and plastic."

"The bulkheads are made in the same manner and provide the ship with sufficient rigidity to completely be able to do without frames."

"The wooden structure can be used again and again, and it is the intention that the patterns which they are in the process of making at the Karlskrona Shipyard will in due course be sent to Denmark to the shipyard which is to build the next six and probably even more Standard Flex boats under license," Blomstergren relates.

After the vehement explosion fires on board British warships during the Falklands War the question has been raised to what extent plastic boats are more liable to catch fire than conventional steel ships.



The finished minesweeper. The Swedish navy has for the present ordered four minesweepers of the Landsort class.

"This is not our experience," Bertil Blomstergren says. "Of course, plastic can burn, but the 60-mm-thick insulation covering and bulkheads mean that heat spreads very slowly. During an experiment we directed an intense spurt of flame against a glass-fiber-sandwich bulkhead and even after an hour's passing it was not hot enough on the other side for articles in the compartment to break into flames."

There is no doubt in Karlskrona that the sandwich system is the future's ship-building method. The Americans, Australians, Swedes, and now the Danes too have made up their minds for the glass-fiber-reinforced sandwich system. The only reason that the British and Italians are stubbornly sticking firmly to

their own much more difficult and expensive principle is, in Bertil Blomstergren's opinion, that they first must have something out of their costly investment in molds.

The shipyard's experts are completely baffled by Social Democratic Defense Spokesman Knud Damgaard's sudden infatuation with the new and totally untested American vinyl ether product. "For one thing, it has been tested only in small boats," the shipyard's technical director concludes, "and for another, the American navy rejected it, and, finally, the Americans have accepted the Karlskrona Shipyard's system."

Minister Wants Opposition Ended

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 19 Jul 85 p 8

[Article by Thorkild Dahl: "Defense Minister Hans Engell: Knud Damgaard Must Stop Firing"]

[Text] Now Social Democratic Defense Policy Spokesman Knud Damgaard must stop firing against the navy's new Standard Flex ships. The project has been discussed very thoroughly and a new invitation to submit bids will not be able to add anything new to the project. On the contrary, it would delay and raise the cost of the construction program.

Defense Minister Hans Engell (Conservative Party) says this after Knud Damgaard now wants a new invitation to submit bids in order to get the series of new ships for the navy built in another plastic material: vinyl ether resin, and not, as already decided, in polyester resin.

Knud Damgaard says that "the minister made a blunder in his assessment of the material for the navy's ships," and for this reason the Social Democratic defense policy spokesman wants a new invitation to submit bids.

"I was of course not deceived in the choice of the material for the ships. There is no place on the globe that ships of this size are built in vinyl ether. In their new extensive minesweeper project the Americans chose polyester," Defense Minister Hans Engell says.

Knud Damgaard says that "the minister's argument has been totally rejected by the Jutland Technology Institute. The experts there say that vinyl ether is completely well suited for building the hulls of the seven ships of the Standard Flex 300 type."

The defense minister rejects the criticism and says that precisely the Jutland Technology Institute reported to the Armed Forces Materiel Command that the institute "was not in possession of data evaluating the utilization possibilities of vinyl ether in comparison with polyester in the special sandwich construction which the Standard Flex ships are to be built with."

However, Social Democrat Knud Damgaard does not want to break the agreement regarding the construction of, for the present, seven new ships for the navy. An additional number of Standard Flex ships is expected to be built in the 1990's, besides.

MILITARY

DENMARK

NAVAL HOME GUARD STARTS TRAINING WITH NEW BOFORS CANNONS

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 27 Jun 85 p 11

[Article by Nils Eric Boesgaard: "Naval Home Guard Being Trained in Shooting with Bofors Cannons"]

[Text] The Home Guard people are being trained in the operation of 50-year-old 40-mm guns which can be put into action in the defense of small ports around the country.

The Naval Home Guard has begun to train gun crews for 40-mm Bofors antiaircraft guns which have been deployed for the defense of harbors around the country. The guns are of the famous model 36, which served the Second World War in allied service and which are hardly any longer of much importance for air defense against supersonic jet planes. However, used against low-flying planes and helicopters or as level-trajectory guns, they are still a very effective weapon. The guns have a firing speed of 120 shots per minute and a range of something under 5000 meters, and will be able to be put into action with great effect against, for example, enemy landing vessels, other unarmored vessels and lightly armored vehicles, HJEMMEVAERNSBLADET [HOME GUARD MAGAZINE] writes.

It is instructors from the navy who are in charge of training in operation of the guns, but otherwise the troops are volunteer Naval Home Guard men from the flotillas and companies which take care of harbor defense.

"There is an enormous difference between training draftees and Home Guard people," says one of the instructors, Kurt Petersen, to the magazine.

"Draftees must be motivated all the time, whereas Home Guard people are motivated and eager. This has resulted in the fact that we can shorten the training time considerably."

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CSO: 3613/164

MILITARY

DENMARK

NEW HOME GUARD CHIEF URGES LARGER PEACETIME REGULAR FORCES

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 27 Jun 85 p 11

[Article by Thorkild Dahl: "Ole Bernt Henriksen, New Home Guard Commissioner: Give Employees Time Off for a Spell in the Home Guard"]

[Text] Armed forces compromises ought to be strengthened, by more draftees, among other things. If the armed forces lose their credibility, the Home Guard is meaningless, in the opinion of the new commissioner, Folketing Member Ole Bernt Henriksen, who wants public institutions to give employees time off for a spell in the Home Guard.

The Home Guard has recruitment again, but acting as a time bomb is the fact that one out of four is ready to leave the voluntary and unpaid job in the Home Guard if the politicians gamble with foreign and security policy.

The new Home Guard commissioner, Folketing Member Ole Bernt Henriksen (Conservative Party), has taken his seat at the Home Guard Command in the Citadel in Copenhagen, and he is not afraid that one of his new main tasks, i.e., recruitment for the Home Guard, will be hampered by the often heated security policy debate at Christiansborg in recent years.

"I am really happy that the Social Democratic Party immediately after the change in government in the fall of 1982 took up the major armed forces debate in the Folketing."

"Since 1949 we had taken NATO membership for granted, but now we have gotten a debate regarding Denmark's security policy. Many people have become involved in the debate and have received much greater knowledge about the armed forces. In the Home Guard we have been forced to inform better and the interest in providing information is great on our part, also outside our own circle," Ole Bernt Henriksen says.

The Home Guard's people in an opinion poll unequivocally informed the politicians that an armed forces without credibility would mean that one out of four Home Guard men or women would be ready to go to the ammunition dump and hand in his/her equipment.

Ole Bernt Henriksen, as a longstanding Folketing member, has been an energetic participant in the foreign policy debate as spokesman for the Conservatives, but "after the Social Democratic Party's unequivocal all-out support of NATO membership" he expects peace and broad agreement between the government parties and the Social Democratic Party when the Folketing's special security policy committee in the fall concludes a major scrutinization of Denmark's foreign and security policy.

Armed Forces Must Be Strengthened As Much As Possible

However, the Home Guard commissioner makes no secret of the fact that "we have an enormous interest in the armed forces' growth."

"If the armed forces are undermined in the armed forces compromises and lose their credibility, then the Home Guard would become meaningless. We are interested in strengthening the Danish armed forces as much as possible."

"The most committed Home Guard people say that my work in the Home Guard is meaningful, but without a credible armed forces the meaningful will disappear," Ole Bernt Henriksen says.

The Home Guard is tied in many respects to the armed forces and their problems. For this reason Ole Bernt Henriksen is also quite satisfied with the fact that the armed forces as an element in the compromise between the government parties and the Social Democratic Party are now getting more draftees.

"This of course provides a freshening up in the armed forces, but it also eases the job for us in the Home Guard when we get them afterwards," Ole Bernt Henriksen says.

After a falling off in the Home Guard in 1984, now there is recruitment again. In the first quarter of this year 2957 reported for the voluntary and unpaid duties in the Home Guard, while 2907 resigned. In recent years there have been about 76,000 in the Home Guard, and the strength was at 76,249 on 1 April of this year.

The recruits for the Home Guard have to a large extent been young people, and although it produces problems that many do not have military training, nevertheless it is "fortunate that we get them so early, before they get other interests. It quickly becomes a habit to be a Home Guard man."

More Draftees

"My wish for future armed forces compromises is that there will be more draftees. The more young people we get without a draftee's training, the more it costs us to train him or her. But it is also important for the democracy that we get more draftees--and this does not necessarily have to mean a drop in the number of enlisted privates," Ole Bernt Henriksen says.

A generation shift has occurred in the Home Guard in recent years with the heavy recruitment of young people.

"Previously not so great demands were placed on us regarding the organization of time. It was all right if an hour extra was wasted by waiting on the rifle range, but the efficient young Home Guard man does not want to waste time. It must be meaningful from start to finish," Bernt Henriksen relates.

At the same time as young people enter the Home Guard, an increasing part of the force is without the personal background from which the Home Guard sprung--the occupation and the postwar years.

"Only barely every third Dane has physically experienced the Second World War. The young people can of course have totally different viewpoints, but then we others have to tell them about it," Ole Bernt Henriksen says, and expresses disappointment over the fact that "history is so limited in public school."

"History plays a role for our understanding of the situation. We must tell the young people about the war, but I could well imagine our in the Home Guard also beginning to teach peace. How countries work together and how conflicts are resolved. Peace has to start somewhere," Ole Bernt Henriksen believes.

Home Guard Model for Others

The commissioner emphasizes that the Home Guard is a valuable asset of the Danish armed forces. An enemy must count on the entire country's being watched over and that he will meet resistance all over.

"The big support is now, as before, an expression of great interest in defense among the people--also among the young. We are being praised abroad, and Great Britain is considering creating a Home Guard according to the Danish model," the Home Guard commissioner reports.

Ole Bernt Henriksen has the main duty of working for recruitment for the Home Guard, and the formula is that the Home Guard's people must be both lively and serious. "And we have many offerings for these people, not only in the Army Home Guard, but also in the Naval Home Guard or the Air Home Guard."

"An important job in the Home Guard is to find the right leaders locally. They must be active men and women. Busy people are the type of people the Home Guard needs. They manage their time strictly but can always find room for a sensible purpose," Ole Bernt Henriksen says.

The Home Guard needs leaders, but at the same time firms can also use the Home Guard's training and should to a greater extent give their employees time off to take on a job in the Home Guard.

"It would be desirable if both private and public institutions learned that it is good for the institution too that their employees receive leadership training in the Home Guard," Ole Bernt Henriksen says.

MILITARY

DENMARK

BRIEFS

HAWK MISSILES TO FUNEN--Two squadrons of HAWK antiaircraft missiles are moving to Funen on August 15, where they will be deployed at the army exercise area in Odense. It took almost three years of negotiations between the Defense Ministry, the Environment Ministry and the Odense City Council and County Council to get the move carried out. It was originally stipulated in the armed forces compromise of 1981, but encountered strong protests not least from disarmament and environment groups, who apparently considered the small defensive antiaircraft missiles on a par with NATO's medium-range missiles. That the order to move is now finally at hand is due exclusively to the fact that the Environment Ministry gave the authorities in Odense orders to fit the deployment of missiles into the environment plan, STAMPERSONEL [REGULAR PERSONNEL] writes, which is published by a number of organizations of employees in the armed forces. The troops will be quartered with the Funen Life Regiment in the barracks in Odense. [By Nils Eric Boesgaard] [Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 21 Jun 85 p 2] 8985

CSO: 3613/164

MILITARY

NORWAY

DEFENSE MINISTER SEES INCREASED ROLE FOR IEPG ARMS COOPERATION

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 19 Jun 85 p 8

[Article by AFTENPOSTEN Correspondent Ivar Granaasen: "Sjaastad: Advantageous Arms Cooperation"]

[Text] London, 18 June. Norway is now participating in six out of 35 panels which the 13 countries in the Independent European Arms Program Group (IEPG) appointed to identify projects which with time can lead to closer cooperation and harmonizing in the defense materiel aspect among European NATO countries.

On Tuesday the group concluded a two-day meeting in London in which Defense Minister Anders C. Sjaastad was the Norwegian representative. He says in a conversation with AFTENPOSTEN that he does not want to strain expectations too greatly but thinks that both last year's meeting in the Hague and the meeting in London show that there now seems to be greater political determination than in a long time to expand cooperation in the important and costly defense materiel sector.

Defense Minister Sjaastad mentions that the 13 defense ministers at the London meeting for the first time in IEPG's almost 10-year history agreed on six areas with operational materiel needs, in areas like new grenades and new short-range anti-armored-vehicle weapons. The group has also made progress with respect to harmonizing the technical specifications for a new generation of medium-range antitank weapons and is nearing agreement on an equivalent long-range weapons system.

The six projects Norway is now actively participating in are almost all associated with the development of computer systems, and the Armed Forces Research Institute (FFI) is playing a central role in this work. In the fall the British will host a conference in which the leaders of the participating countries' research and development institutions will discuss further how Europeans can utilize their resources better. Although advanced computer technology will play a central role in IEPG's talks, Defense Minister Sjaastad asserts that the London meeting did not discuss questions in connection with the USA's space weapons program (SDI), or the French initiative, Eureka.

Defense Minister Sjaastad thinks that it can take a long time before any concrete results are seen from the talks in IEPG. However, he believes it is

advantageous to take part in the work because Norway, which is a member neither of EC nor the West Union here has a forum in which we can take part on an equal footing with other European countries.

In connection with the IEPG meeting, the defense ministers of France, Great Britain, West Germany, Italy and Spain held talks regarding a new joint European combat plane (the EFA).

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CSO: 3639/132

MILITARY

NORWAY

DANISH, NORWEGIAN EXPERTS AIR NATO REINFORCEMENT

Growing Importance of Arctic

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 26 Jun 85 p 3

[Article by Alf Seeland: "Danish and Norwegian Experts Agree: NATO Presence in North"]

[Text] Kirkenes, 25 June. NATO's possibilities of securing communication lines across the Atlantic became better last year, but it is desirable to have more allied presence in the northern regions. This was both the Norwegian and Danish opinion at the Nation and Defense conference which continued in Kirkenes today. North Sweden's importance was stressed by the Swedish chief of staff.

Danish security policy expert Captain Hans Garde took as a point of departure the deterioration which took place through the 1970's in securing NATO's supply lines across the Atlantic as a consequence of the Soviet naval buildup. A long list of measures were begun on the part of the West and united in the "Rapid Reinforcement Plan" from the NATO Supreme Command in 1982.

Show Presence

For Norway this involves, among other things, earmarked allied forces in a crisis situation and stockpiling in Trøndelag. Captain Garde asserted that although the situation we had when the alliance was created has not been re-established, at least the situation has been turned around so that there is again a reasonable probability that reinforcements can be delivered so that they can have an influence on any possible war situation in the northern regions.

On the other hand, Garde asked the question whether it is not about time that the alliance shows its presence to a greater extent in northern waters, even if not on a permanent basis.

"It can be necessary to see the flags of the other countries in the alliance in order to balance the impression that the Soviet navy is dominant in peace time. It can be important for communications across the Atlantic and thereby

for solidarity in the alliance that we further demonstrate in peace time our will to ensure communications," he said.

Sweden Northward

Swedish General Staff Commander, Vice-Admiral Bror Stefenson declared that Sweden is paying increasing attention to the northern regions. He characterizes the situation in Central Europe as a "stalemate" and said that from Sweden's viewpoint it is in the north that relations are being attempted to be changed by the two superpowers. He predicted that the northern regions' strategic importance will increase in the future and that the Swedish armed forces will take the consequences of this through stockpiling in North Sweden and increased exercise activity there. "Qualitative growth is the Swedish armed forces' strength," he said, but added, "The difficulty is quantity."

North Norway Most Important

Sweden's capacity to quickly send reinforcements northward has a reassuring effect on us, Defense Ministry Undersecretary Oddmund Hammerstad asserted, and he praised the Swedish defense effort. Hammerstad also declared himself totally in agreement with Garde in the desire for greater allied presence in the Norwegian Sea. "It is a question of international waters and why should NATO not be able to be there when we see what is taking place in the Baltic," he asked of critical Swedish voices who were worried about an "escalation" in the northern regions.

"North Norway is still our most exposed section of the country," Hammerstad stressed and characterized the defense behind the Lyngen Alps as so strong that a possible adversary faces the alternative of a major war if he ventures in. He stressed that Norway has built up a high level in watchfulness and alerting which is fully understood in the Kremlin.

"But we must borrow the strength from outside. Strength in peace time in order to use it in negotiations with the Soviet Union; among other things, regarding dividing lines. We joined NATO in order to remain there," Hammerstad said and asked the hall the unanswered question whether it would have been better with a Scandinavian defense alliance.

Paper Discusses Conference

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 29 Jun 85 p 2

[Editorial: "Threat Against the Life Line"]

[Text] The northern regions have for a rather long time been gaining increasing military and geopolitical importance. We all know that the Western defense alliance did not want this situation. The relatively low tension had through the so-called Scandinavian balance for many years contributed to the fact that the regions around Norway were problem free, and in the West this was looked on as a decided advantage. The buildup of the Kola Peninsula

to become the world's most bristling naval base and an instrument of the "State's sea power" in the service of the Soviets totally changed the situation.

The Soviet ability and determination to strain the Greenland-Iceland-Great Britain line has long threatened Norway with being cut off from the life line in our defense and security policy: the possibilities of reinforcements across the Atlantic from the USA and Canada. This even in peace time would have given the Soviet Union opportunities for political pressure on Norway, which has been a familiar Russian policy toward neighbors all the way since Ivan the Great's time.

At the Nation and Defense Scandinavian conference in Kirkenes this week it was established that the situation has improved for the Western alliance's life line across the Atlantic. This is due in part to the forced carrying out of the NATO Supreme Command's "Rapid Reinforcement Plan," with its use of Western forces. And in part we can thank increased American naval growth for the fact that there are again good prospects for North American troops' being able to come to rescue Norway.

A main condition for this has been the stockpiling of allied heavy conventional materiel in Trøndelag, and what with the seriousness of the situation it is almost unbelievable that anyone at one time could protest against this stockpiling. It ensures that our allies can move troops to Norway in the first phase of a conflict without being delayed by having to drag along all the equipment which is necessary in order to have an opportunity to defend our country. The calm which has fallen over the left in this question indicates that the point has finally been understood.

During the conference named, it was pointed out from Swedish quarters that the strategic situation in Central Europe has stabilized, almost in a "stalemate." It is in the northern regions, it was claimed, that the super-powers have chances for being able to upset the balance. The Swedish armed forces have for their part taken the consequences of this through the stockpiling of materiel in North Sweden and increased exercise activity there. This represents somewhat of a change from the "Baltic State" of Sweden.

Although it is difficult to say it aloud among Swedish politicians, they are completely aware of what we here at home can put into words: It is the continuing Soviet naval program, now with the building of six to eight /aircraft carriers/ [in italics], too, and at least two of which will be deployed in the northern fleet, which threatens to upset the balance between East and West, and Scandinavian low tension.

The Western defense alliance must protect itself with all available defensive means against Soviet sea power. These means include also a united opinion which understands the importance of a strong defense, and agreement regarding the lines in our security policy which have been carried on from 1949 to today. We cannot afford to shift our security policy interests to exotic problem formulations other places in the world. The northern regions are and will be the most important element in our security policy. And it is a matter of the Atlantic life line.

MILITARY

NORWAY

SECURITY AFFAIRS EXPERT ON CRUISE MISSILES, USSR EXERCISE

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 2 Aug 85 p 2

[Article by John Berg: "Soviets Can Strike--Fast"]

[Text] "No to cruise missiles in the Norwegian Sea" is a request that is being echoed in Norwegian security policy debate today. The reason for this is that the United States is planning to equip its fleet with these missiles. It is being said that this is part of an advanced strategy and that it will lead to a further escalation of the arms race, which we must protest. Consequently, we are now demanding that all allied navy vessels coming into Norwegian ports must declare they are not carrying nuclear arms.

A Soviet flotilla was operating in the North Atlantic during the latter half of July. In a war situation, the flotilla's surface vessels, together with its supporting submarines and long-range aircraft, could have fired about 200 cruise missiles at NATO flotillas and convoys. And this is by no means the absolute limit on a Soviet flotilla's capacity with respect to such weapons in these waters.

Practically Every Day

Soviet vessels equipped with cruise missiles are plowing through our waters practically every day of the year. Long-range aircraft capable of carrying cruise missiles operate continuously from the Kola Peninsula. And this has been going on for a long time. The Soviet Union has been equipping its planes and vessels with such weapons since the end of the 1950's. During the period 1958-1976, the Soviet fleet acquired 12 kinds of cruise missiles, 6 for use from surface vessels, 1 from submarines and 4 for use from both submarines and surface vessels. Gradually, some Western nations deployed similar missiles, but it did not become clear until the latter half of the 1970's that the United States would concentrate on such weapons. Today we know that the Soviet Union at that time had long since started to develop new, more advanced cruise missiles for its fleet.

Misconceptions

In the reaction pattern behind "No to cruise missiles in the Norwegian Sea" we see the same basic misconceptions that have characterized the peace movement's reasoning in general and greatly influenced the Labor Party's security policy. These misconceptions are most obvious relative to developments at sea than anywhere else. Therefore, it might be useful to take a closer look at them.

Relative Strength

It is being said that, in spite of everything, U.S. and NATO naval forces are superior and that the new U.S. fleet plan is therefore an expression of a more offensive fleet strategy. But military forces can never be evaluated on a numerical basis alone distinct from their operational roles. As far as NATO is concerned, supply lines across the Atlantic represent "the main artery" and, in the event of war, a defeat at sea would mean the end. A similar defeat would mean a serious setback for the Soviet Union, but it would not sever any "main artery." They would be advancing across land. This means that entirely different standards need be applied to NATO and Soviet naval forces. The Soviet Union would be able to employ its fleet in a large-scale offensive to sever "the main artery" in the critical period of time needed to win a military expedition in Europe. NATO would have to cover large ocean areas to protect essential convoys. From a tactical standpoint alone, the Soviet Union to a large extent would be able to choose the time and the place, and there could easily be situations in which two or three Soviet submarines would "equal" a dozen NATO vessels--plus planes and helicopters too.

Cruise Missiles

Against these realities, we need to defend the claim that U.S. cruise missiles are supposed to be so much more effective. Here, as elsewhere, it is a basic misconception to think that a weapon's effectiveness can be evaluated on the basis of its theoretical, technical capabilities. In the event of war, the two parties' cruise missiles will not be racing each other. They will play various operational roles, using different tactics, and will be supported by various other kinds of weapons within the framework of the naval forces, of various composition, and against various targets. Should a Soviet flotilla of submarines, aircraft and surface vessels succeed in mounting a united, coordinated offensive from several directions, NATO navy and transport vessels in the area would be exposed to dangerous torpedo attacks--and, at the same time, a swarm of a couple of hundred cruise missiles from several directions at various altitudes and speeds. The comparatively moderate cruise missile attacks during the Falkland war because the British suspected submarines in the waters might illustrate the significance of 200 Soviet cruise missiles.

These operational differences may also serve to highlight the most widespread misconception of all, namely that the two parties' chain of reasoning and, consequently, their assembled forces as well are exactly the same. The belief that when one party procures 100 new missiles the other responds with at least 100 similar missiles is, at best, a gross simplification. In all areas,

the parties develop their own operational concepts and assembly of forces based on different operational goals and needs. As we already mentioned, this is perhaps most obvious at sea. For a quarter of a century, the Soviet Union has steadily and persistently developed its naval forces, with cruise missiles as one of its primary weapons, completely independent of the United States' having such weapons.

Flight Missions

The United States has not chosen to develop cruise missiles because the Soviet Union has them, but because operational considerations have shown they are necessary. One reason is that hangar-based aircraft are increasingly flying missions across land. The reason for this, of course, is not the Soviet fleet's cruise missiles, but that nations's land-based military development.

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CSO: 3639/148

MILITARY

NORWAY

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PLANNING: DEFENSE CONCEPT ELEMENT

Bonn NATO BRIEF in German May/Jun 85 pp 24-30

[Article by Maj Gen Tor Rolf Bryntesen, director general of Norwegian civil defense and of the Office for Emergency Preparedness Planning: "Norway's Civil Emergency Preparedness Planning: Part of an Overall Defense Concept"]

[Text] Norway lies in the extreme north of Europe and of the NATO territory and shares a northeasterly border of 130 miles with the Soviet Union. One of the largest fleet bases of the world--the Soviet naval base on the Kola Peninsula--lies only 60 miles the other side of this border. Naturally, this exerts a deep influence on Norway's thinking.

Additionally, we have 450 miles of border with Finland and 1,000 miles with Sweden. The distance from the extreme south to the north cape is 1,100 miles, the deeply clefted coastline with its many fjords, however, measures 12,500 miles.

With its approximately 4 million inhabitants, Norway is among the smaller NATO nations--only Iceland and Luxembourg have fewer inhabitants. However, when one compares the land mass of the European NATO countries, only Spain, Turkey and France are larger than Norway. Northern Norway alone--that is to say, the three northern provinces--is as large territorially as Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands combined. Southern Norway is approximately the same size as the Federal Republic of Germany.

In short, the large geographic extension, the long borders and the enormously long coastline in contrast to the limited funds and available manpower, as well as in regard to climatic changes, make it compellingly necessary to utilize all available means and to concentrate them toward a maximum effort to defend the country.

Shortly after World War II, the Norwegian Government established a "great defense commission" whose task was to create the foundations for our defense policy, our defense system and our defense organization. The commission introduced the total defense concept and emphasized the need to expand the Norwegian defense organization accordingly. According to the commission, this defense organization would have to include a civilian organization in addition to military defense, which would be able to carry the military effort and to protect the civilian population against the tragedies of a war.

The principle of the concept of total Norwegian defense creates the moral foundation for our work and makes it a duty of all civilian, political and administrative offices, private organizations, enterprises and establishments to play their appropriate roles in a society which is forced to exert total effort in the defense of its country.

The defense concept consists of two aspects--the military and the civilian. In this connection, it must be stressed that the dividing line between both components is drawn somewhat differently in Norway than it is in other countries. An entire series of tasks which often are counted as part of the military effort elsewhere have been transferred to the civilian sector in Norway, primarily in the area of logistics, and it has thus been possible to keep the logistics "appendix" of the Norwegian Armed Forces down.

By applying the same principles to reinforcing units, it should be possible to keep the size of resupply units for such forces small and, thus, also be able to manage with a smaller transport capacity.

The principal tasks of civilian emergency preparedness planning can be described as follows:

- i. maintenance of an orderly society;
- ii. maintenance of the health and work ability of the population and its will to defend the country;
- iii. assurance of the logistic support of the total defense effort;
- iv. facilitation of the best possible utilization of resources;
- v. minimizing the effects of enemy attacks against civilian targets.

The planning also includes preparation for crises in peacetime. This policy of "double employment" stems from the fact that the civilian defense and emergency preparedness planning can also protect lives and property in peacetime during catastrophes over and above its role of acting as a deterrent and of protecting the population in the event of an attack.

The principal threat against which the preparations of Norway are directed is a conventional war; but the possibility that the enemy could use nuclear, biological or chemical weapons is taken into account to a certain extent. In this area the economic possibilities create limitations.

Based on a government recommendation, the Norwegian Parliament--the Storting--approved the following long-term goals for civilian emergency preparedness planning in 1981:

- i. securing of provisions for a period of 3 months in a peacetime crisis, given certain curtailments in normal consumption;

- ii. securing the fulfillment of military and civilian defense requirements in the event of war in accordance with predetermined standards;
- iii. securing survival possibilities in the event of war for at least 1 year on the basis of Norwegian domestic production and stockpiles;
- iv. facilitation of the most essential requirements of the population on a slightly higher level than mere survival for 6 months.

The Organization

In normal times, the public service operates in accordance with the general principle: distribution of civilian emergency preparedness planning in peacetime, implementation of the state of emergency in the event of war and taking over tasks from specialized areas of activity at various levels.

Today, the work is essentially carried out at three organizational levels: on the central level, the provincial level and the community level.

The Central Level

At the central level the government naturally takes total responsibility for civilian emergency preparedness planning. As far as the various ministries are concerned, they make plans for preparations in various sectors for which they are responsible during peacetime and are responsible for the implementation of these plans. Supervision and coordination of the daily work are the responsibility of the Directorate for Civil Defense and Emergency Preparedness Planning, which consists of three departments: civil defense, administration, and economic preparedness and administration. Thus, the principal tasks of the directorate are also the coordination and oversight of civilian emergency preparedness planning and civil defense.

At the central level a number of advisory groups are also active which, among others, deal with questions of civilian emergency preparedness planning. The highest ranking body which occupies itself directly with this topic is the Coordination Council for Civilian Emergency Preparedness Planning, which oversees all efforts in this area and coordinates the work of the various ministries.

Additionally, there are a number of agencies which have special missions, such as the NORTRASHIP Shipping Company, which is responsible for a substantial segment of NATO sea transportation.

The Provincial Level

At the provincial level the governor has the principal responsibility for civilian emergency preparedness planning. He coordinates and supervises the entire area of planning and preparation in his province. Additionally, he promotes emergency preparedness planning at the community level and participates in planning to support the armed forces. In these tasks he is aided by a small emergency preparedness planning staff.

The Community Level

Communities which are obligated by law to make certain preparations for civilian emergency preparedness in certain sectors such as civil defense, health service and logistics, are important elements in the planning to support the armed services and the civilian population on the ground.

Planning

Civilian emergency preparedness planning traditionally encompasses three main areas:

- i. normal planning for the transition from a peacetime to a wartime footing, as well as the solution of such problems as evacuation, protection against radiation, etc.;
- ii. planning for peacetime crises such as a possible oil catastrophe;
- iii. long-range planning to create the best possible foundation for mastering an emergency situation or a war which includes the establishment of a firm bond between plans, budgetary tasks and constitutional jurisdiction of the various cabinet members.

These three elements extend to the following six sectors into which the planning has been divided:

1. information,
2. administrative preparedness,
3. economic preparedness,
4. health care,
5. civil defense,
6. the role of the police.

1. Information

Preparations for information activity during an emergency or in the event of war are in the hands of the state secretary for information within the Office of the Prime Minister. Upon orders from the prime minister an organization would be called into being which would be designated as the "government press service in times of war." This service, whose task it would be to provide correct and complete information to the public within and without Norway, would consist of personnel from newspapers, press agencies and from Norwegian radio and television. In addition, a few representatives from the Office of the Prime Minister, from the Ministry of Defense and from the Directorate for Civil Defense and Emergency Preparedness Planning would be assigned to it. The wartime organizations of each provincial governor would have information

units assigned to it. My directorate is responsible for information regarding civil defense activities and emergency planning in peacetime.

2. Administrative Preparedness

This sector is concerned with seeing to it that, in the event of an emergency or a war, the civilian administration functions correctly in order to maintain an orderly society.

A number of laws were passed which regulate preparations and activities in an emergency or in the event of war. Many of these laws have been on the books for 25 or 30 years and encompass the most important aspects of an emergency. I, therefore, am proceeding from the assumption that the legislative foundations in this area in Norway have been regulated in a satisfactory manner.

Personnel required for the wartime organization have been appointed and are constantly trained within the framework of NATO exercises and national maneuvers.

The important civilian agencies at the central level have protected wartime headquarters, as do most of the provincial governors. Only very few of the community agencies have protective bunkers.

3. Economic Preparedness

Economic planning is aimed at securing a sensible utilization of available resources in order to master the demands of total defense and the requirements of the population.

The essential tasks of this planning and the necessary preparations are made by the normal agencies in peacetime at the central, the provincial and the community level. My directorate coordinates and supervises this planning.

Planning extends to foodstuffs, environment, clothing, energy, industry, transport and telecommunications, above- and below-ground construction, banking and finance, as well as the labor market. It is not possible, here, to detail all of these things but I would nevertheless like to mention a few things briefly. The food situation is satisfactory. The population of Norway could survive on the basis of our own agricultural production, fisheries and grain stockpiles although we would have to make some changes in our menu. Norway's energy requirements are met in peacetime by waterpower and oil in equal proportions. Hydroelectric power, therefore, reduces our vulnerability in the energy sector quite considerably. In addition, our oil extraction operations in the North Sea have further reduced our problems in the event of a peacetime crisis but is not made a part of any war supply planning. We, therefore, consider it necessary to safely stockpile adequate supplies. Current stockpiles of all types are estimated to be sufficient to supply us for 150 days in the event of war.

Norwegian industry is heavily dependent upon the import of raw materials. Appropriate stockpiles are sufficient for an average of 2 months but, in some

cases, no more than 2 or 3 weeks. Consequently, industry has few possibilities for meeting wartime demands. As a result, an extensive stockpiling program as a preventive measure would be desirable but is not achievable in the current economic situation.

On the basis of Norway's geographic and topographic situation, it is clear that transportation and telecommunications require special efforts in order to guarantee a satisfactory status of readiness. Plans have been worked out on how to overcome most of the problems in this area but telecommunications connections between the various parts of the country are vulnerable to the effects of weather, let alone enemy action.

Apart from this general background of economic preparedness, it might perhaps also be interesting to mention economic planning in support of the armed forces.

The provincial governors have the task of selecting retail merchants who might be in a position, in the event of a mobilization, of supplying military units from their stockpiles. Once suitable suppliers are found, special contracts are concluded with respect to the merchandise involved. Provincial governors also plan deliveries to military collection points where units can be supplied with foodstuffs and other merchandise after mobilization.

Although this procedure is simple, it does create certain problems. For example, inventories in the hands of individual merchants are usually low and their normal customers would be disadvantaged if the merchandise were to be requisitioned for the military. Inventories in the hands of wholesale merchants--which are also relatively limited--are mostly located in congested areas; in other words, in areas which are not necessarily the most important when seen from the military employment planning standpoint. This, in turn, could lead to overburdening transport capacity.

Another aspect of economic planning in support of the armed forces concerns military above-ground and below-ground construction work. Although my directorate is responsible for administrative oversight in this area, the planning is largely done on the ground by provincial governors who are in a better position to judge the production capacity of local enterprises and can see to it that these contractual enterprises receive the necessary materiel and human resources. The principal tasks for civilian contractual firms involve the erection of fortifications and the repair of runways.

4. Health Care

Planning in this area is based on the health care system and the normal procedures as they are utilized in times of peace; in times of emergency or a war, this service would be expanded further.

The preparations are generally satisfactory but such areas as stockpiling of drugs and medicines unquestionably still require greater efforts. Another problem would be the shortage of hospital beds in northern Norway in the event of a war. However, steps are being undertaken to improve this condition

through the erection of a number of reserve field hospitals, through mobile hospitals and through disaster protection units. Over and above this, there are plans for the evacuation of wounded to southern Norway.

5. Civil Defense

The goal of civil defense is the planning and execution of nonmilitary measures to prevent or minimize the damage caused to the civilian population by acts of war and the rendering of aid in the event of catastrophes or large accidents in times of peace.

The missions are outlined in the civil defense law of 1953 which presents the legislative foundation for the civil defense organization and its activities. The most important tasks of civil defense include the warning system, shelters (protective bunkers), evacuation plans, local civil defense forces and mobile civil defense units. The central management of civil defense lies in the hands of the Directorate for Civil Defense and Emergency Preparedness Planning, whose general director is chief of the civil defense forces in Norway--at the regional level management is accomplished by the provincial governors.

Every province is divided into civil defense districts--there is a total of 54. At the head of each district stands the police chief who has a small civil defense staff at his disposal. The districts are, in turn, subdivided into local civil defense regions--thus far there are 108. There are three training facilities for civil defense as well as a central training school which is subordinated to the directorate. This central school is devoted primarily to the training of personnel working in the area of civil emergency preparedness planning or civil defense. In addition, all industrial enterprises which employ more than 40 persons have their own civil defense organization which is financed by the establishment itself. Thus, almost 1,600 enterprises with over 30,000 employees are active in civil defense.

If we now turn to the principal mission of civil defense--the system which, in the event of war, warns against an immediate danger--one can say that it is supported by the military air traffic control and warning system. It includes approximately 1,800 sirens mounted in suitable locations. In urban areas these sirens can reach approximately 90 percent of the population.

Since 1948 Norway has built public and private air raid shelters which afford varying degrees of protection against blast, radiation and contamination. Currently, three types of shelters are being built which correspond to the threat which is anticipated for a given area.

The first type affords protection against the effects of nuclear and conventional weapons as well as against chemical agents. Such shelters have been built in about 50 communities. The second type protects against conventional weapons, radioactive fallout and chemical agents. This type has been erected in 120 communities. Then there are still shelters effective against radioactive fallout which exist in about 130 communities. In the remaining 150 communities the construction of shelters is considered unnecessary since these territories are only very thinly populated and are far away from all possible profitable targets.

The degree of protection and the technical requirements are the same for all public and private shelters with the only difference being in their financing. Public shelters are erected by communes which receive up to two-thirds of their approved costs from the government. Our goal is the attainment of 375,000 public shelter places. Thus far, 230,000 places are available with the annual addition of 7,000 to 10,000 places occurring.

Owners of buildings with more than 150 square meters of ground area are erecting and financing private shelters. Since 1975 private residential houses are exempt from these provisions. Currently, we have more than an estimated 1.8 million private shelter places and this number grows each year by about 50,000.

We have a total of more than 2 million shelter places, which are adequate for more than 50 percent of the population of the country. If one considers the scattered nature of the population of Norway, then this is a noteworthy result. Unfortunately, the close to 900,000 shelter places are no longer adequate for today's requirements but practically all provide protection against conventional weapons and radioactive fallout.

On the basis of the large land mass of Norway compared to its population, protection in certain regions and under certain wartime conditions will have to be accomplished by evacuating the population into safer regions. Such evacuation plans exist for 40 municipal areas which have a population of some 500,000 people. Additionally, there are specialized plans for the evacuation of people who live in the vicinity of airfields and other important military installations.

Service in civil defense is compulsory for Norwegian men and women between the ages of 18 and 65 who are not intended to perform other wartime duties. The current goal is for the 108 local civil defense units to have a mobilization strength of 47,000 men--currently some 46,000 personnel are available who have been trained to use the necessary equipment plus about 10 percent reserves.

Every local civil defense organization is divided into a number of civil defense units, action groups and first-aid groups. These groups have a different table of organization; the action groups have between 30 and 250 members and the first-aid groups between 15 and 100 members, depending on the number of people for whom they need to care. Naturally, every group has vehicles and firefighting vehicles and first-aid equipment.

Additionally, 14 mobile units can be mobilized which are stronger and more mobile than the local units which are supposed to provide support in case of emergency. Furthermore, they are supposed to carry out rescue operations in areas in which there are no local units. Their total mobilization strength amounts to 10,000 men who have the best equipment and training.

6. The Role of the Police

In the event of an emergency the role of the police would generally be the same as that in peacetime. Some supplemental tasks, such as the protection of installations and control of population movements, would be added. The

Norwegian police currently has 5,500 men on the force who can be reinforced by the addition of 4,500 reservists in case of war. Both the active police as well as the reserves are regularly subjected to training involving their war-time missions.

And finally, a word about financing. It would be difficult to make a comparison with the other countries of the alliance but it is perhaps noteworthy that Norway spends around 240 Norwegian kronen--around \$25--per person per year for purposes of civil emergency preparedness planning. One can see that very extensive steps have been taken and will be taken in order to realize the concept of total defense through legislation, planning, organization, training and financing--however, much remains to be done on the material side.

5911

CSO: 3620/465

MILITARY

NORWAY

STRAY URGES EFFORT TO BALANCE FORCES NEAR USSR BORDER

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 7 Aug 85 p 5

[Article: "Stray: Allied Support In North Must Be Readied"]

[Text] It is only in alliance with other Western democracies, where even in peace time we prepare military cooperation and reinforcements, that we meet our need for security and give ourselves political independence as a nation. This was strongly emphasized yesterday when Foreign Minister Sverre Stray spoke to an international meeting of the leadership of the Norwegian Atlantic Pact Committee. Stray maintained that our basic policy does not prevent us from building military installations to a level which would make it possible to accept allied support.

Nordic balance was the central subject in Stray's talk. "All the Nordic countries have mutual respect for the different directions countries are taking in their security policy," said Stray, who believed that this has given Europe stability, and the Nordic countries have contributed to the comparatively low level of tension which is to be found in the region. This is also in the interest of the Atlantic Alliance.

The foreign minister pointed out that the two alliances touch along the Norwegian/Soviet border. In terms of the military we have an imbalance in this region, where Soviet superiority directly affects global equilibrium with the United States.

"It will hardly be possible to establish a permanent regional military balance in this part of Europe. For this reason we have taken steps to make reinforcements possible during crises or when there is a threat of war. If the security of the allied flank is threatened, then stability in the Nordic region as well as the alliance as such will be negatively affected."

12789
CSO: 3639/150

MILITARY

NORWAY

COUNTRY'S LARGEST ARMS MAKER SEEKS DIVERSIFICATION

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 18 Jun 85 p 64

[Article by Brit Myhrvold: "Kongsberg Weapons Plant Banking on Knowledge of Market"]

[Text] "The Kongsberg Weapons Plant has a number of difficult years behind it without our having to cut down on longterm investments. We can perhaps be criticized for thinking too longterm. We have perhaps done a little too much star gazing, but hope that the road has not become too bumpy," KV [Kongsberg Weapons Plant] Administrative Director Rolf Qvenild says to AFTENPOSTEN. The Kongsberg Weapons Plant is in the process of carrying out a structure plan in which the catchwords are concentration, internationalization and consolidation.

The Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk A/S [Kongsberg Weapons Plant, Inc.] parent company is now concentrating its activities on four main areas which derive great benefit from existing jointly, although it is a question of different markets. They are the defense industry, offshore, motor vehicle parts manufacturing and turbines.

Internationalization is taking place by the Kongsberg Weapons Plant's to an increasingly greater extent staking on joint ventures with companies which have market knowledge. An example of this is the international agreement which was entered into between the American Dresser Industries and the gas turbine business, and last year's sale of 49 percent of Kongsberg Engineering to McDermott International. This last agreement has already produced several foreign assignments.

But KV's biggest international project up to now is participation in the airplane engine project in a joint venture with Pratt & Whitney Aircraft. This project is very longterm and requires an investment of one half billion kroner from now to 1992. The Kongsberg Weapons Plant has already received 200 million kroner in new share capital from the state in connection with this project.

Last week it became known that KV is getting a 600-million-kroner contract for supplying Penguin missiles to the Norwegian air force. This is a contract which will extend to 1990. Another example of longterm activity is offshore, where KV is now working with underwater production equipment. Here we are

probably seeing just the first part of development toward the Troll era in the 1990's.

KV's venture in motor vehicle parts made of magnesium is also a project with longterm prospects, Director Qvenild stresses.

The Kongsberg Weapons Plant has also placed its stakes outside those areas which are now characterized as main areas. This concerns companies like Geco, SysScan and NPC. Here the concern has in part realized assets, for example, by selling Geco shares. Kongsberg aims to remain in NPC, although this company's future ownership structure seems uncertain at present.

In spite of the fact that the Kongsberg Weapons Plant is at the top technologically speaking, the last few years the company has operated with a deficit. The deficit last year on a concernwide basis, before extraordinary items, was a good 97 million kroner. The sale of shares, in Geco, among others, brought the balance up to plus 8.9 million kroner before annual adjustment measures. This is to be regarded as a bottom-line profit for a concern with operating revenues of 2.3 billion kroner. Production capacity at the Kongsberg Weapons Plant was utilized by only 50 percent last year, but the utilization of capacity will be better already this year. The losses last year came especially in the gas turbine division, the part of the computer operation associated with computer-aided design, and in Norcontrol, which is now being reorganized.

"Final figures in the first half of this year will continue to bear the mark of problems, but there will be an improvement already in the second half of the year," Director Qvenild says, who does not want to set figures for this.

Qvenild says that the main areas which the Kongsberg Weapons Plant is concentrating on constitute a logical whole. But with the technologically advanced environment the concern has it will also act as a spawning ground for new ideas. These ideas can lead to the establishment of new businesses in which the technology and know-how come from KV, but in which others put up the venture capital.

The establishment of such new businesses is probably relatively quite imminent, but Qvenild will not go further in concretizing them than to say: It can be a question of the utilization of knowledge regarding turbines in other areas, and of putting defense technology to use in civilian fields, and of spinoff effects from the computer side. In spite of the problems with computer-aided design, KV's combined activity within computers and electronics is among the country's largest.

8985

CSO: 3639/132

MILITARY

SWEDEN

NEW HEAD OF MILITARY'S FOREIGN SIGNALS MONITORING AGENCY

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 11 Jun 85 [page not known]

[Article by Sune Olofson]

[Text] "During the training I am now going through, I have become very pleased and encouraged by the capacity and capability of the Armed Forces Radio Institute [FRA: Foersvarets radioanstalt]," says diplomat Paer Kettis, 51. As from 1 July he will be the new head of Sweden's most secret activity.

Officially, his qualifications in military intelligence are as good as nonexistent. Now he is to be the first diplomat to run the FRA, the pride of the armed forces. He is becoming the head of an expensive activity at a secret number of listening stations along Sweden's coasts.

"In my work as a diplomat, I got some experience in trying to nose out what plans and objectives other countries have. This job will probably be something similar, but with completely different methods."

Paer Kettis has recently returned to Sweden after some years as the number-two man at the Swedish embassy in Washington. Before that he was the head of the UN section at the Foreign Ministry in Stockholm. At that time [current] Defense Minister Anders Thunborg was ambassador to the UN in Washington [sic].

"One day suddenly a year ago, I had a phone call from Anders Thunborg, whom I know very well; he wondered whether I wanted to become the head of the FRA. It was quite surprising, but I answered yes almost immediately. The job is enormously interesting, after all."

Swedish diplomats have an official list of qualifications, but in addition sometimes an unofficial one connected with efforts performed for the Military Intelligence Service [Informationsbyraan, IB]; the activity is now called SSI, the Section for Special Intelligence-collecting [Sektionen foer saerskild inhaemtning]. To put it crudely, the SSI occupies itself with Swedish espionage. Paer Kettis assures us that he does not have any hidden qualifications....

Antiaircraft Defense

"When I was a conscript I was the intelligence officer with an antiaircraft unit. That is all. I remember how hard it was even back then to collect intelligence."

The FRA occupies itself with signal intelligence [SIGINT], military "ears" which pick up the signals released into the ether by weapon systems, tanks, aircraft, ships, submarines, troops, and land-based command centers.

"It is the FRA's mission to continually collect intelligence about the military activity going on in our vicinity. The Baltic Sea is central for the FRA."

There is where the FRA's latest addition is sailing, the intelligence collector ORION, which has not yet been shown to the press by the armed forces.

It is said that the FRA is very good at SIGINT. However, there are few people in a position to check the truth value of that claim.

Kettis does not want to describe the FRA's capability in detail, but it is asserted that the FRA can listen far into the surrounding Warsaw Pact countries. If something is happening that can threaten Sweden, the FRA is to know it first. Paer Kettis's predecessor, Lars Ljunggren, confirmed for SvD [SVENSKA DAGBLADET] that the FRA knew at an early stage that the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 was being planned.

"But we are a neutral country, of course, so we also listen to the west," says Paer Kettis somewhat slyly and smilingly.

Paer Kettis knows Eastern Europe. Among other things, he was stationed in Warsaw for five years. He has an answer to SvD's question whether he got to know Soviet diplomats during the UN years in the U.S.

"I had very good contacts with the man closest to Dobrynin, the Soviet ambassador to the UN."

Now Paer Kettis has traveled around in the country and visited the FRA's listening posts. And he is impressed.

Technology-Intensive

"A good mood among a group of technologically very expert people who are doing extraordinary work for the country. And now I know what we can do."

The FRA costs about 200 million [Swedish kronor] per year. That is 80% of the budget of the military intelligence service. The FRA is a technology-intensive undertaking; most of the listening posts under ground are equipped with advanced computers.

Throughout the day and night, military signals are picked up. The radio operators report their observations to the FRA's coordinating center on Lovoe [Island] outside Stockholm. There a first evaluation is made of the information. If it deviates from the normal pattern, Commander in Chief Lennart Ljung is informed, who in his turn alerts the government.

Statements Denied

Actually, one can assert anything at all about the FRA, which never denies or confirms statements about its activity. But when the peace newspaper PAX some years ago asserted that FRA's radio direction finders were connected to NATO's defense system, the FRA's management reacted and Lennart Ljung issued a denial.

Paer Kettis, who has three daughters, comes from Aelvdalen, where his father's farm is called Kettisgaarden [the Kettis farm], whence the family name.

"Most people think I am from the Baltic states, but that is incorrect."

He inaugurated his career, based on his own interests, by "jumping into the Riksdag [Parliament] to learn." Suddenly he was hired as a chancery clerk.

"I was a so-called shouter in the second chamber, the one which announces decisions that have been voted."

As from 1 July, Paer Kettis has a job with a significantly lower profile. Since its origin during the war, the FRA has been fenced around with the greatest possible secrecy. The secret number of employees are all placed in skyddsklass [Protection Category One] by Saepo [the Security Police]. Paer Kettis has not yet received any advice on personal security protection.

"The Armed Forces Staff probably assumes that I can hold my tongue," he says.

CSO: 3650/311

ECONOMIC

DENMARK

FINANCE MINISTER DEFENDS POLICIES IN DEBATE

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 30 Jun 85 p 10

[Interview with Finance Minister Palle Simonsen and economic commentator "Monitor" by Lisbeth Knudsen and Ole Dall at the BERLINGSKE TIDENDE office building; date not given]

[Text] Palle Simonsen: The government's profile has not changed. The media have turned privatization into a "major issue." We are firmly committed to a spending policy.

Monitor: The profile is rubbing thin at the edges. The government is juggling with figures. The minister suffers from "memory lapses."

Who is Monitor? He is an anonymous commentator who regularly gives politicians good advice in the columns of BERLINGSKE TIDENDE.

It is Monitor's job to interpret developments in society and then criticize and advise the government currently in office. Monitor is not the voice of BERLINGSKE TIDENDE but a concerned citizen who observes and offers comments.

"I am well aware that Monitor's views are not identical with BERLINGSKE TIDENDE's position. That has been a consolation at times," Finance Minister Palle Simonsen said with a smile.

Control over the economy--or runaway spending? An unchanged government profile or one that is rubbing thin at the edges? Finance Minister Palle Simonsen and the anonymous commentator Monitor met recently in the offices of BERLINGSKE TIDENDE for a free-for-all debate on Danish policy at this time.

They did not see each other but conducted their duel via a telephone "hot line." Monitor took the offensive.

[Monitor] Is zero growth something the government feels strongly about? Shouldn't the government clarify its standpoints once in a while so that the dividing lines between political viewpoints become clearer?

[Simonsen] Zero growth in public spending is not primarily a question of attitude, of course, but an economically vital element. But there is some ideology involved to the extent that this government does not want the public sector to be any bigger than it has to be.

We often hear with reference to the economic recovery that the government should be careful not to turn into a "cleaning company" whose only job is to straighten out the economy. We are urged to pay more attention to matters of principle. But what are they?

Firm principles are involved in an austere spending policy, for example, and nonsocialist principles are also involved in the economic recovery policy. The Danish economy has to be straightened out.

Many other things enter into the picture. To name a few, great efforts are being made in the educational, cultural, labor market, health and social sectors to show that a different policy is being pursued than would be the case under a Social Democratic government.

But it is obvious that at times the tight spending policy does not give us the opportunities we would like to implement some of the things that are most characteristic of a nonsocialist position.

I have no doubt that we have demonstrated a new position. Just take the Social Democrats' anger at the government. That is perhaps the best evidence that the government is well on its way toward changing things in society.

If one compares the profile of the four-party coalition government with that of the VKR [Liberal-Conservative-Radical Liberal] coalition I think there is now a very big difference in favor of the nonsocialist viewpoints. Much more nonsocialist policy has been implemented than one could expect from a minority government.

[Question] Could we have some concrete examples of how the government's profile could be given a more nonsocialist cast?

Right-Wing Target

[Monitor] I don't really think the government's profile should be made more nonsocialist. But as the prime minister has said we must be careful that the government does not turn into a target for forces on the extreme right. That would be an unfortunate situation for a government made up of nonsocialist parties. When the government took office it said that recovery was the first priority and then it would be the turn of other things.

Naturally the recovery has taken up a lot of the government's time but if the government does not also take a long-range view and form a concept of its policy after the recovery has been accomplished, I do not entirely agree that its profile has been clearly defined. The Social Democrats would sharply criticize a nonsocialist government under any circumstances--no matter what policy it pursued. It concerns me somewhat that you have not approached the substance of the policy that will be pursued as soon as the economy has been "straightened out."

[Simonsen] We do not want to contribute to a polarization by presenting a very sharp profile and on that point I agree with Monitor. But it should be obvious with regard to a number of basic issues that this is not a Social Democratic government.

I have mentioned the recovery and the public sector and in addition I might mention autonomy--a greater degree of responsibility on the part of individual citizens--changes in the educational system, an end to Danish Radio's monopoly, etc. This is all part of creating a new style.

But we should not create untenable myths around our ideas. I would like the critics to tell me where they want to see the nonsocialist position more sharply defined.

[Monitor] When the government took office it was really capable of outlining a profile that was different from that of the preceding Social Democratic governments. Now 3 years have gone by and parts of the recovery policy have been successful. It should be time now to start thinking about the government's more long-term objectives.

There is time this summer to sit down and consider how to etch a more fundamental political profile. That is not necessarily the same thing as creating a polarization with respect to the Social Democrats.

[Simonsen] What is the difference between the government's profile now and its profile when it first took office? I have a hard time seeing any difference.

[Monitor] I can easily find some examples. With respect to privatization you issued guidelines on procurement privatization. But have you taken concrete initiatives on the state level to show that the government is following the idea up with specific actions?

One might also think it would be wise for a liberal government to attack the subsidies that are pouring out to the private business sector. You could also use this as a defense against critics on the left who claim that you are pursuing a very reactionary policy.

[Simonsen] In the area of privatization the government is especially interested in promoting procurement privatization. This means enabling the public sector to purchase goods of the best quality at the lowest prices,

but this is not something that changes from day to day. Incidentally the government has never wanted privatization in the education and health sectors.

As far as business is concerned we have reduced state support for businesses year after year. That is a clear indication of our political position. But it is also clear that at a time when we are so dependent on increasing business production we may have to take it a little easy when it comes to eliminating subsidies. It is not enough to raise the flag. There must also be some contact with the ground.

My feeling--which was reinforced by Monitor's comment today--is that the problem is that the government is no longer new. There were 21 new ministers who helped to give the impression of an entirely different profile almost 3 years ago. As time went by the public got used to these 21 people and it is clear that the effect of this familiarity is to give the impression that "things are not as exciting as they were before." This intensifies the need to "polish" the profile so that the public does not get the impression that it has changed. I say that there is no change. If it looks that way it is because the "honeymoon" has been over for a long time.

Juggling Figures

[Monitor] It is my impression that the spending policy is based on illusion to some extent. When the government claims time after time that it has control over public spending it is primarily a demonstration of its possibilities for juggling figures.

However if one looks at developments in real public consumption one can see that this government has not managed to get things under control either. It is only because this government uses net figures that it can claim to have checked public spending during its period in office.

If one looks at the trend in gross consumption of resources there has also been growth in this government period. The government is not presenting the true facts.

In the first place it must be noted that a very large part of the results that have been achieved came from increasing revenues in the spending budget.

The government has also resorted to a trick used by earlier governments. A good deal of the savings burden was transferred to the private sector by continuing the policy of sharp reductions in public investment activities.

[Simonsen] I simply do not understand many of the arguments presented by Monitor.

The goal for spending in 1984, 1985 and 1986 is simply to maintain an unchanged spending level in terms of fixed prices and we have succeeded in

doing this. I know that you say that the only reason this has been possible is that we produced a lot of new revenue. But what kind of revenue?

For example the increase in the payments for unemployment insurance have been added to the revenue budget. This reduces the deficit but does not affect the spending budget. Revenue has been increased by raising fees for DSB [Danish State Railways] and the Post and Telegraph System in exactly the same way as in the old budget system. There have been some small increases in registration fees, but that is about it.

Shooting Over the Mark

You are shooting over the mark when you say that we have concealed spending trends by introducing new revenues. The new revenues are very small and in reality they have an ideological basis. It is the goal of the government to do away with the principle of getting something for nothing and thus it is not an extra tax when we introduce fees in various areas.

The decisive thing is the actual course of events on the spending side. There was a spending framework of 187.8 billion kroner in the 1984 budget. In the supplementary appropriations bill this figure had been cut to 186.6 billion. In the balance sheet that is being prepared for 1984 this has been further reduced to 185.8 billion kroner. We are actually 2 billion kroner below the budget estimate.

Here is another figure we can use to get to the bottom of this discussion. The budget proposal for 1985 contained estimated outlays of 191.4 billion kroner when it was presented in August 1984. The budget proposal we are presenting on 15 August this year has a price tag of 188.1 billion. That is 3.3 billion kroner less--in spite of the fact that price and wage increases have been figured in. Incidentally no other country has come up with the zero growth that we have been able to accomplish in this country.

Memory Loss

[Monitor] You say that the goal for 1984, 1985 and 1986 was zero growth. Isn't that a form of memory loss, for if we look at the budget report for 1983 the actual goal was a real decline of 3 percent in gross outlays from 1983 to 1984. Apparently this has been forgotten.

And doesn't it bother the finance minister that the only place the government has been able to economize on resource consumption is in the investment area. It has not been possible on the operating side.

[Simonsen] I can tell Monitor that I do not suffer from loss of memory--at least not in the area you mentioned! It is correct that the trend from 1983 to 1984 did not show a 3 percent decline in gross spending outlays.

That is because we had a minority government and we have frankly admitted that it was not possible to get a 3 percent decline implemented. The main

thing for us is to maintain zero growth and in reality that requires saving 4-5 billion kroner a year.

The discussion of whether or not there have been real savings is an old one. I have been social affairs minister myself and I know that in that sector real savings were definitely made--among other things by reducing benefits in the assistance law and introducing a waiting period. Despite the pressures resulting from a number of new educational subjects the Education Ministry has also been able to make real savings by means of rearranging priorities.

It is true that investment outlays have been cut by the state, the counties and the municipalities. After all that is the area where it is possible to cut off funds very quickly. But real reductions have been made in resources--especially through reducing the block grants to municipalities. That has turned out to be an excellent control mechanism.

[Question] Monitor has said and written that growth in public spending has not been checked. Does Monitor doubt that the government will be able to eliminate the deficit in the national budget by 1990?

[Monitor] The budget deficit could very well be eliminated--while at the same time there is an upward trend in public spending. The two things do not necessarily have anything to do with each other.

[Simonsen] I would like to point out that when spending levels are kept unchanged, reducing the deficit in state finances will go faster. There is that much of a connection.

Modernization Flagship

[Monitor] Is it correct to say that the modernization program must be regarded as the government's ideological flagship?

[Simonsen] It is only correct if one takes a narrow view of my role as finance minister.

[Monitor] Aren't you privately worried about the fact that the modernization program has been so vaguely worded that it will be very difficult to decide whether or not it has led to any tangible results? How can one find out whether the modernization program has helped to produce a more up-to-date personnel policy? And how are the voters supposed to know if the program has been good or bad?

[Simonsen] Naturally it is very hard to measure results and that is why it is so easy to criticize the modernization program. The only way it can be carried out is if there is a change in attitude among workers in the public sector. Among other things an extensive course activity must be carried out and we have come a long way with that.

One cannot change a trend from one day to another. Nor can one chart the results that have been achieved with diagrams. But when we have come a little farther you will at least be able to measure our ability to make better use of the meager resources at our disposal. And in the long run it will be quite obvious to our citizens that the public sector has become less bureaucratic.

Privatization and the Government

[Monitor] Is it totally inaccurate if Monitor says that the modernization program has helped to tone down other elements in government policy--such as deregulation and privatization?

[Simonsen] There is no question of toning down deregulation. When the government started out we tried to eliminate a long list of unnecessary circulars and announcements. We have come a long way but we cannot continue along these lines for years and years. Now it is more a question of simplifying more complex areas--starting with the entire grievance sector and the relationship to the private sector.

With regard to privatization there is a misconception I would like to clear up. There has been a myth circulating for some time that when I became finance minister I turned everything that had to do with privatization upside down. The truth is that there has never been any difference in attitude between my predecessor and I when it comes to privatization.

Who is it that actually made privatization a big exciting topic? First and foremost it has been the media.

I have asked myself which came first, the four-party government or the debate on privatization. The concept of privatization is being discussed in all the industrial nations and the debate began 3-4 years ago. It did not start because of the four-party government but came into existence at the same time as that government.

[Monitor] I assume that the government did not look unfavorably on the fact that the privatization debate started up when the government came into existence?

[Simonsen] No, we certainly didn't mind but we are not the ones who gave the debate certain overtones from 1983 to 1985. Many people made it a broad theme, but it was only one out of around 25 items in the government's modernization program.

Some Agreement

[Question] The Social Democrats have evidently decided that part of the summer debate should concern the export of bonds. Erling Olsen has said that instead of sending the finance minister abroad the government has sent bonds abroad and has handled its financial problems that way. People have

said that this makes our economy incredibly sensitive to the state of the market. Does the finance minister have any comments on that?

[Simonsen] My first comment is that it is nice to have another example of our ideologically-dominated policy. For this is a result of our desire to have a free flow of capital. I do not understand the criticism being aimed at bond sales by the Social Democrats.

The main reason why sales are so high just now is that other countries have a great deal of confidence in the Danish economy and anticipate interest declines. When this occurs sales will automatically drop.

In my opinion the sales we have had so far have not had a negative effect on us. It has been said that this is an expensive way to get money. This of course depends on what one is using as a comparison. The Social Democrats are comparing this to the interest rates on German marks and Swiss francs, but this is not correct. Our borrowing needs are so great that we are forced to finance a large part of our foreign debt with dollar loans and when we compare the cost of dollar loans with financing through krone bonds the difference is minimal.

[Monitor] Of course a freer flow of capital is a good idea and since we are a very small country with a very open economy we are forced to adjust our economic policy to international conditions.

[Simonsen] At last! That is something we agree on.

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CSO: 3613/174

ENERGY

NORWAY

OIL SEARCH BEGINS ON SVALBARD

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 3 Aug 85 p 8

[Article by Morten Wang: "Norsk Polar and Blystad Collaboration: Oil Search On Svalbard"]

[Text] Through the firm of Arctic Development Corporation, Inc, Wilhelm P. Blystad has begun collaboration with Norsk Polar Navigasjon, Inc, on joint petroleum activity in 118 of Norsk Polar Navigasjon's land claims on Svalbard.

"I think there are possibilities on Svalbard; this is what geological surveys point to," Wilhelm P. Blystad said to AFTENPOSTEN.

The collaborative work agreement was signed yesterday and made public after Norsk Polar Navigasjon's executive meeting early yesterday evening. The company was asked to give a report of its activity on Svalbard by the Oslo Stock Exchange. Rumors about the company have been circulating for a long time, while prices of the company's stocks have soared dramatically at the same time. On Thursday trading of the company's stock was halted in expectation of a report.

The agreement was signed by Norsk Polar Navigasjon and its partners K/S Norsk Svalbardolje, Inc, Norsk Vikingolje, Inc, and Arctic Development Corporation, Inc. Wilhelm P. Blystad has told AFTENPOSTEN that the last-named company was established solely with this activity in mind, and that Blystad himself is the principal shareholder.

"I have gambled because I have a general interest in the Svalbard area. It has been in the doldrums for so long that it is now time to do something," Wilhelm P. Blystad said. He believes there are prospects of finding hydrocarbons. He will now have these prospects investigated further. Blystad said that it would be difficult for Norway to extract oil and/or gas from a land area profitably.

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September 11, 1985